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EQUITY IN LLC LAW? 
MOHSEN MANESH*  
ABSTRACT 
 To what extent does equity play a role in LLC law? To what extent do courts retain the 
judicial discretion “to do right and justice” in circumstances in which the LLC statute and 
the applicable LLC agreement do not otherwise offer an adequate remedy to an aggrieved 
LLC member or manager? Until recently, the answer to these questions was quite clear: 
Equity is subordinate to the freedom of contract and the express terms of the agreement 
governing an LLC. But the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Carlisle Etcetera 
has upended this basic percept of LLC law and practice. Carlisle suggests that courts need 
not sheepishly defer to the express terms of an LLC agreement. Instead, where justice dic-
tates a different result, Carlisle suggests that courts retain the equitable power to apply 
fiduciary standards or recognize other equitable rights or duties, despite the statutorily man-
dated freedom of contract under LLC law. Thus, this Article argues that Carlisle represents 
a true paradigm shift. It inverts the long-assumed supremacy of contract over equity in LLC 
law. Instead, the freedom of contract must be exercised always in the shadow of equity.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 To what extent does equity play a role in limited liability company 
(“LLC”) law? To what extent do courts retain the judicial discretion “to 
do right and justice” in circumstances in which the LLC statute and 
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the applicable LLC agreement do not otherwise offer an adequate rem-
edy to an aggrieved LLC member or manager?1 
 This question is particularly relevant in Delaware, which plays an 
outsized role in LLC law due to its status as the leading legal haven 
for LLCs.2 Unlike many other states’ statutes, Delaware’s LLC statute 
purports to “give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract and to the enforceability of [LLC] agreements.”3 Exercising 
this freedom of contract, LLC parties routinely agree to limit or wholly 
eliminate fiduciary duties,4 the judge-made duties that courts have 
traditionally applied to ensure equity in business associations.5 And in 
                                                                                                                                        
 1. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 205 (Del. 2008) (“[T]he final object of equity is 
to do right and justice.” (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, § 60, at 80 (5th ed. 1941))); see also William T. Quillen & Michael Hanra-
han, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery—1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
819, 821 (1993) (“[E]quity is a moral sense of fairness based on conscience.”). 
 2. As is the case for corporate charters, Delaware is the preeminent choice of law for 
large LLCs. See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The Naked Fiduciary, 54 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 879, 901 (2012) (finding that in a dataset of 150 LLCs in which one or more party is a 
public company, over half were organized under and governed by Delaware law); Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Lim-
ited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 116 tbl.2 (finding that among closely held 
LLCs with 50 or more employees that form outside of their home state, more than 61% are 
organized under and governed by Delaware law); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market 
for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 202 
(2011) [hereinafter Manesh, Market for LLC Law] (observing that all 15 of LLCs that filed 
for or completed an initial public offering during a six-year period ending March 31, 2010 
were chartered in Delaware); Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited 
Liability Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis 3 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and 
Econ. Research Paper No. 126, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1633472 [https://perma.cc/ER2M-ZLFF] (finding that among closely held LLCs 
with 5000 or more employees that form outside of their home state, more than 95% are or-
ganized under and governed by Delaware law); see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades 
of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as 
Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 460 (2008) (“ ‘Delaware law seems to exert an 
almost gravitation pull’ on LLC practice and jurisprudence.”). 
 3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016). 
 4. See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008) (LLC agreement eliminating 
all liability associated with fiduciary duties, other than for “fraudulent or illegal conduct”); 
CNL-AB LLC v. E. Prop. Fund I SPE (MS Ref) LLC, No. 6137–VCP, 2011 WL 353529, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 28, 2011) (LLC agreement permitting the managing member to act in its “sole 
and absolute discretion . . . without consideration of any other obligation or duty, fiduciary 
or otherwise . . . .”); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *12-
13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (LLC agreement explicitly eliminating all fiduciary duties owed 
by officers and directors of a publicly traded LLC); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–
CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (LLC agreement eliminating all fiduciary 
duties by explicitly limiting the parties’ duties to those “expressly set forth” therein); see also 
Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. 
CORP. L. 24, 27 (2016), (providing evidence showing that fiduciary waiver or modification is 
common among privately held LLCs).  
 5. See, e.g., J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discon-
tents: Reflections on Unincorporated Business Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 493, 505 (2009) (arguing that fiduciary duties enable courts to “police misconduct . . . 
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deference to the LLC statute, Delaware courts have found themselves 
robotically enforcing these agreements without ever seriously ques-
tioning whether such enforcement is fair, reasonable, or just given the 
circumstances.6 Thus, until recently at least, based on statute and 
precedent, the role of equity in LLCs seemed clear: Equity is subordi-
nate to the freedom of contract and the express terms of the agreement 
governing an LLC.  
 But the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Carlisle Etcet-
era LLC7 has upended this basic precept of LLC law and practice. 
Carlisle suggests that, as a state constitutional matter, Delaware 
courts need not sheepishly defer to the state’s LLC statute or the ex-
press terms of an LLC agreement.8 Instead, where justice dictates a 
different result, Carlisle suggests that Delaware courts retain the eq-
uitable power to apply fiduciary standards or recognize other equitable 
rights or duties, despite the statutorily mandated freedom of contract. 
Thus, this Article argues, Carlisle represents a true paradigm shift. It 
inverts the long-assumed supremacy of contract over equity in LLC 
law. Instead, the freedom of contract must always be exercised in the 
shadow of equity.9 
 This Article explores the implications of Carlisle in four Parts. Part 
II briefly traces the origins of equity and its role in modern business 
associations. As this Part explains, although LLC law embraces fidu-
ciary duties and other principles that originated in equity, Delaware’s 
LLC statute and case law also make clear that these equitable princi-
ples may be limited or wholly displaced by the terms of an  
LLC agreement.  
 Part III then explores the peculiarly constitutional basis for equity 
in Delaware and its implications for freedom of contract in LLCs. Car-
lisle suggests that, as a state constitutional matter, equity cannot be 
subordinated by statute or contract. Yet, there is also a problem with 
Carlisle: it squarely conflicts with a previous Delaware Supreme Court 
opinion, CML V, LLC v. Bax, decided just four years earlier.10 Today, 
                                                                                                                                        
based on broader societal concepts of fairness”); Kleinberger, supra note 2, at 465 (“Fiduciary 
duty attaches to [business associations] to proscribe and constrain abuses of power.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Wood, 953 A.2d at 141-44 (dismissing claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
in a publicly held LLC); In re Atlas Energy Res., 2010 WL 4273122, at *12-13 (dismissing 
claims for breach of fiduciary duties in a publicly held LLC); Related Westpac LLC v. JER 
Snowmass LLC, No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (dismiss-
ing claim for breach of fiduciary duty in a privately held LLC); Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 
1961156, at *11 (dismissing claims for breach of fiduciary duty in a privately held LLC). 
 7. 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
 8. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 9. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (demonstrating how the “shadow of the law” 
forces parties to take into account what would happen in the event of adjudication by a court). 
 10. 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011). 
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that conflict remains unresolved. Part IV, however, argues that Car-
lisle signals the demise of Bax and a resurgent role for equity in LLCs. 
Recent developments involving both Delaware’s LLC statute and its 
judiciary support this conclusion.  
 Still, Part V contends that even if Carlisle is proven correct, as a 
practical matter, equity is unlikely to mount a widespread assault on 
the freedom of contract in LLCs. Both policy and pragmatic consider-
ations suggest that the Delaware courts will be exceedingly sparing in 
the use of their constitutionally vested equitable powers. Conse-
quently, the express terms of LLC agreements, including fiduciary 
waivers, will continue to be routinely enforced in the vast majority of 
cases. But what Carlisle means is that the Delaware courts need not 
unquestioningly defer to the express language of an LLC agreement in 
every conceivable circumstance—especially when presented with con-
duct that is manifestly opportunistic, exploitative, or otherwise 
inequitable. Thus, the practical consequence of equity for LLC law and 
governance will be subtle: the very existence of an unwaivable judicial 
power “to do right and justice” may serve as a prophylactic deterrent 
against brazen overreach or exploitation. 
II.   EQUITY AND THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN LLCS 
 The path to Carlisle has its roots in the medieval distinction be-
tween law and equity. Section A explores that history and its relevance 
to contemporary business associations, in particular the recognition in 
equity that those vested with the legal right of control over a business 
owe a fiduciary duty to the business and its owners. Section B then 
explains how the Delaware Chancery Court has adapted this equitable 
principle to LLCs. Finally, Section C describes the apparent subjuga-
tion of equity by freedom of contract under Delaware’s LLC statute 
and case law. 
A.   Equity and the Law of Fiduciary Duties  
 In medieval England, equity arose as a corrective salve to the in-
justice wrought by the early common law.11 The early English courts 
of law applied a highly technical, inflexible system of substantive law 
and procedure.12 As a result, petitioners with legitimate claims before 
                                                                                                                                        
 11. See POMEROY, supra note 1 §§ 50-51, at 64-65. For a historical perspective on the 
origins of equity in medieval England and its Greek and Roman antecedents, see generally 
id. §§ 2-39; HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, §§ 1-3 (2d ed. 
1948); Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 
26-40 (1951).  
 12. See POMEROY, supra note 1, at §§ 16-17, at 20-21; Maurice A. Hartnett, III, The 
History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 48 BUS. LAW. 367, 368 (1992). 
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these early law courts were often denied justice because of the courts’ 
rigid adherence to perceived common law precedents or formalistic 
technicalities.13 These petitioners would sometimes appeal to the king, 
the realm’s ultimate legal authority.14 As sovereign, the king retained 
the royal prerogative to ameliorate any harsh results obtained in his 
law courts—to do justice between subjects by recognizing rights and 
ordering remedies that were not available in the courts of law.15 Over 
time, as the number of these petitions became increasingly burden-
some, the king delegated his royal power to do justice first to his 
highest royal officer, the Chancellor, and eventually to a full-time 
court, known as the court of chancery or court of equity.16   
 Consistent with its origins and purposes, courts of equity developed 
separate doctrines to provide relief to aggrieved parties where the law 
courts did not recognize a legal right or provide for an adequate rem-
edy.17 These equitable doctrines emphasized flexibility and fairness, 
rather than technicalities or formalism, enabling equity courts to ex-
ercise discretion to do justice where the facts of a given case so 
required.18 This room for discretion has been famously decried as ena-
bling unpredictable results—that equity is as arbitrary as the size of 
the “chancellor’s foot.”19 But judicial discretion is also at the very heart 
of equity jurisprudence.20 Equity enables a court to take into consider-
ation the special circumstances of a given case in order to do justice 
                                                                                                                                        
 13. See Harnett, supra note 12, at 368. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Oleck, supra note 11, at 33. 
 16. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 1, at 2; POMEROY, supra note 1 §§ 33-35, at 38-
40; Harnett, supra note 12, at 368; Oleck, supra note 11, at 35-36. 
 17. See Harnett, supra note 12, at 368 (“[C]hancery restricted itself to hearing only 
those cases where other courts could not afford an adequate remedy.”); Quillen & Hanrahan, 
supra note 1, at 820 (“[The medieval] Court of Chancery . . . provided judicial relief to those 
left remediless because of the procedural rigidity, corruption, and inadequate enforcement 
machinery of the common law courts.”). 
 18. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 1, at 2; Harnett, supra note 12, at 368. 
 19. English law scholar John Selden famously critiqued the unpredictability of discre-
tion in equity:  
Equity is a roguish thing: for [in] law we have a measure [and] know what to 
trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is [the] chancellor, and 
as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis . . . as if they should make the 
standard for the measure we call a foot, [to be the] chancellor’s foot; what an un-
certain measure would this be? One chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, 
[and] a third an indifferent foot: ‘tis the same thing in the chancellor’s conscience. 
JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 62-63 (Edinburgh, Thomas Con-
stable & Co. 1854). 
 20. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 23, at 49-52. 
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where the strict application to law would otherwise serve injustice.21 
As one former Delaware Chancellor has succinctly described it, 
“[E]quity is the recognition that the universal rule cannot always be 
justly applied to the special case.”22 
 The American colonies inherited from the English this bifurcated 
system of law and equity.23 In fact, after the Revolution, many of the 
newly independent states continued with separate courts of law and 
courts of equity.24 Today, while most U.S. jurisdictions have merged 
the two—empowering courts of general jurisdiction to apply both eq-
uitable and legal doctrines25—a small minority retain separate 
equitable courts of chancery,26 most notably Delaware.27 
 Many bedrock principles familiar to contemporary business lawyers 
originated in equity.28 Some examples include the rights of partners to 
seek judicial dissolution of a partnership where it has become imprac-
ticable to carry on the partnership business;29 the derivative standing 
                                                                                                                                        
 21. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 1, at 2 (defining equity by “the fundamental end 
of attaining . . . justice in the particular case, and the means of attaining that end by discre-
tion in adapting the remedy to the particular case”); Oleck, supra note 11, at 38  
(“Necessarily, . . . equity, could not effect substantial justice without by-passing precedent 
when a situation demanded special treatment.”). 
 22. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 821-22; see also Oleck, supra note 11, at 23 
(“Equity is the correction of the . . . law where it is deficient by reason of its universality (i.e.: 
its tendency to establish rules without exceptions.”). As Professor Johnson has pointed out, 
the idea that the strict application of universal rules may lead to injustice in specific cases 
is one that dates back to Aristotle. See Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 709 (2011).  
 23. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 5; Harnett, supra note 12, at 368-69 (describing 
the English heritage of equity in colonial Delaware); Oleck, supra note 11, at 40-41; Quillen 
& Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 822-31 (same). See generally Solon D. Wilson, Courts of Chan-
cery in the American Colonies, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 
(1908) (providing a historical account of the courts of chancery in colonial America).  
 24. See Oleck, supra note 11, at 41. 
 25. See POMEROY, supra note 1 § 40, at 45; Oleck, supra note 11, at 42. 
 26. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, only four states retained separate 
courts of law and equity: Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee. See John J. Wat-
kins, Law and Equity in Arkansas - Or, Why to Support the Proposed Judicial Article, 53 
ARK. L. REV. 401, 404 (2000). Arkansas merged its courts of law and equity in 2001. See ARK. 
CONST. amend. 80 § 6(A) (2001). 
 27. For more on the importance of the Delaware Chancery Court in the business law 
context, see Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence 
of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture in Providing Justice, 
48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992); William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570 (2012). 
 28. Another common business law doctrine sometimes associated with equity is corporate, 
or limited liability, veil piercing. See, e.g., 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 48 (2016). There is, 
however, some disagreement among courts as to whether veil piercing is truly an equitable 
remedy. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 535 (2001). 
 29. See, e.g., In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 601 (Del. Ch. 2015) (discussing 
the origins of judicial dissolution in equity). 
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of shareholders to bring a suit on behalf of a corporation;30 and, most 
importantly, the fiduciary duties owed by trustees, agents, partners, 
and corporate directors and officers.31  
 “The hallmark of a fiduciary relationship is that one person has the 
power to exercise control over the property of another as if it were her 
own.”32 Hence, the relationship between a trustee and trust benefi-
ciary, between an agent and her principal, among general partners, 
and between corporate officers and directors and the corporation’s 
shareholders have all been categorized as fiduciary in nature.33 In each 
instance, “one [party] reposes special trust in and reliance on the judg-
ment of another . . . .”34 “The relationship connotes a dependence”35—
a vulnerability that the party vested with control could exercise that 
                                                                                                                                        
 30. See, e.g., Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 201-02 (Del. 2008) (discussing the history 
of derivative standing in equity); accord CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1044 (Del. 2011) 
(quoting Schoon). 
 31. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 711-13 (describing the origins of fiduciary duty in 
equity); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69-72 (same); see also 
McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (Allen, C.) (“Among the 
most ancient of headings under which chancery’s jurisdiction falls is that of fiduciary rela-
tionships. . . . Chancery takes jurisdiction over ‘fiduciary’ relationships because equity, not 
law, is the source of the right asserted.”). 
 32. Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 3874–VCS, 2009 WL 2501542, 
at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2009) (Strine, V.C.); accord Bond Purchase, L.L.C v. Patriot Tax Credit 
Props., L.P., 746 A.2d 842, 864 (Del. Ch. 1999) (Steele, V.C.) (“[A] fiduciary is typically one 
who is entrusted with the power to manage and control the property of another.”); Malone v. 
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“An underlying premise for the imposition of fiduciary 
duties is a separation of legal control from beneficial ownership. Equitable principles act in 
those circumstances to protect the beneficiaries who are not in a position to protect them-
selves.” (citation omitted)); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary 
Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (“[F]iduciary relationships form when one party 
(the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion 
with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.”); Julian Velasco, Fiduciary 
Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 159 (2013) (“A fiduciary relationship 
is a legally recognized relationship in which one is given power over the interests of another, 
who thereby becomes vulnerable to abuse.”). 
 33. See Sokol Holdings, 2009 WL 2501542, at *3 (“[A]rrangements typically giving rise 
to fiduciary relationships include trusts, corporations, partnerships, and estates.”); 
McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604-05 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“Our law has 
acknowledged several [fiduciary] relationships beyond that of express trustee and corporate 
officer or director: general partners; administrators or executors; guardians and, in some 
instances, joint venturers or principals and their agents.” (citations omitted)); see also In re 
USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991) (Allen, C.) (“The law of trusts repre-
sents the earliest and fullest expression of [the fiduciary] principle in our law, but courts of 
equity have extended it appropriately to achieve substantial justice in a wide array  
of situations.”).  
 34. Cheese Shop Int’l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d 689, 690 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev’d on other 
grounds, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973). 
 35. Id. 
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control carelessly or exploitatively, in their own self-interest.36 To pro-
tect against this vulnerability, equity recognizes a fiduciary duty of 
care and loyalty owed by those vested with the legal right of control 
over the property of another.37 Applying the fiduciary principle in the 
context of business associations, equity ensures that those vested with 
legal control of a business do not opportunistically exploit that control 
to benefit themselves at the expense of the business or its true owners.38 
B.   Fiduciary Duties in LLCs  
 As compared to partnerships and corporations, LLCs are a relatively 
new form of business association.39 Indeed, Delaware did not adopt its 
                                                                                                                                        
 36. See Smith, supra note 32, at 1482-83 (explaining that the rationale for fiduciary 
duties is to protect the beneficiary from opportunism that arises from the discretionary 
power wielded by the fiduciary); Velasco, supra note 32, at 159 (“[T]he raison d’être of fidu-
ciary duties, and of the designation of relationships as fiduciary, is the protection of the 
beneficiary from abuse at the hands of the fiduciary.”). 
 37. As Chancellor Allen has explained,  
[T]he principle of fiduciary duty, stated most generally, [is] that one who controls 
property of another may not, without implied or express agreement, intention-
ally use that property in a way that benefits the holder of the control to the 
detriment of the property or its beneficial owner. There are, of course, other as-
pects—a fiduciary may not waste property even if no self interest is involved and 
must exercise care even when his heart is pure—but the central aspect of the 
relationship is, undoubtedly, fidelity in the control of property for the benefit  
of another.  
USACafes, 600 A.2d at 48. Elsewhere, Chancellor Allen has also explained the equitable 
origins of fiduciary duties:   
The classic example—the accountability of trustees—demonstrates the reason 
why chancery takes jurisdiction over fiduciaries. The “fiduciary” duty of a trustee 
to deal with the trust res only for the benefit of the cestui que trust and not for 
his own benefit is a creation of equity. At law a trustee, as the legal owner, may 
deal with trust property as his own. The rights of a beneficiary are only recog-
nized in equity. Accordingly, an action predicated upon such rights is properly 
maintained in a court of equity and only a court of equity. A similar rationale 
underlies Chancery’s traditional jurisdiction over corporate officers and direc-
tors. The duties they owe to shareholders with respect to the exercise of their 
legal power over corporate property supervene their legal rights. 
McMahon, 532 A.2d at 604 (citations omitted). 
 38. See Crosse v. BCBSD, Inc., 836 A.2d 492, 495 (Del. 2003) (“This Court has held that 
‘the concept of a fiduciary relationship . . . applie[s] in legal relationships where the interests 
of the fiduciary and the beneficiary incline toward a common goal in which the fiduciary is 
required to pursue solely the interests of the beneficiary . . . .’ ” (quoting Corrado Bros. v. 
Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 562 A.2d 1188, 1192 (Del.1989))); Sokol Holdings, 2009 WL 2501542, 
at *3 (Strine, V.C.) (“The reason Chancery has jurisdiction in such cases is because tradi-
tionally only the rights of the legal owner are recognized at law, and equity is left to protect 
the rights of the beneficial owner.”). 
 39. See generally William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Ante-
cedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855 (1995) (providing a historical account of the LLC business 
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LLC statute until 199240—well after the equitable doctrine of fiduciary 
duty was established in other business contexts. But Delaware’s LLC 
statute has always contemplated that “[i]n any case not provided for [by 
the statute], the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern.”41 
 Accordingly, analogizing to other, more established business 
forms, Delaware courts have readily adapted existing equitable prin-
ciples to LLCs.42 With respect to fiduciary duties specifically, even 
though the Delaware LLC statute does not affirmatively impose such 
duties on any party,43 the chancery court had little trouble recogniz-
ing that those vested with control and discretionary power over an 
LLC “easily fit[] the definition of a fiduciary”44 and, therefore, owe 
traditional fiduciary duties.45   
                                                                                                                                        
form); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1459 (1998) (same).  
 40. See Limited Liability Company Act, 68 Del. Laws 1329 (1992) (codified as amended at 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (2016)); see also Hamill, supra note 39, at 1475-76.  
 41. § 18-1104. 
 42. See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850-51, 855 n.65 
(Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.) (analogizing the fiduciary duties owed in the corporate context to 
the fiduciary duties owed in a manager-managed LLC); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 
649, 662 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Laster, V.C.) (analogizing the fiduciary duties owed in the limited 
partnership context to the fiduciary duties owed by the managing member of a member-
managed LLC); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *7-11 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (Noble, V.C.) (analogizing the fiduciary duties owed by a controlling 
shareholder in the corporate context to the fiduciary duties owed by a controlling unitholder 
of an LLC); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 n.73 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 
2010) (Parsons, V.C.) (observing in the context of determining the fiduciary duties owed in a 
manager-managed LLC that “[m]anger-managed LLCs are, in many ways, analogous to cor-
porations, whereas member-managed LLCs may be more analogous to a partnership”); Bay 
Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at 
*9 n.43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (Strine, V.C.) (observing in the context of determining the 
fiduciary duties owed by the managing member of a member-managed LLC that “in the ab-
sence of developed LLC case law, this court has often decided LLC cases by looking to 
analogous provisions in limited partnership law”); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 94 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (Strine, C.) (analogizing judicial dissolution under DGCL 273 in the corporate context 
to judicial dissolution of an LLC). See generally Obeid v. Hogan, No. 11900–VCL, 2016 WL 
3356851, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016) (discussing the judicial practice and propriety of 
analogizing LLCs to general and limited partnerships and to corporations). 
 43. Auriga, 40 A.3d at 849 (“The Delaware LLC Act does not plainly state that the tra-
ditional fiduciary duties . . . apply by default as to managers or members of a [LLC].”); see 
also ROBERT L. SYMONDS, JR. & MATTHEW J. O’TOOLE, SYMONDS & O’TOOLE ON DELAWARE 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 9.04[B][3] (2d ed. 2015) (The statute leaves “such matters 
[i.e. fiduciary duties] to [the] development in the Delaware case law.”). 
 44. Auriga, 40 A.3d at 850; accord id. at 854 (“[M]anagers of LLCs easily qualify as 
fiduciaries under traditional and settled principles of equity . . . .”); see also Feeley, 62 A.3d 
at 661 (Laster, V.C.) (“The managing member of an LLC ‘is vested with discretionary power 
to manage the business of the LLC’ and ‘easily fits the definition of a fiduciary.’ ” (quoting 
Auriga, 40 A.3d at 850-51)). 
 45. See, e.g., Auriga, 40 A.3d at 851 (Strine, C.) (“[B]ecause the LLC Act provides for 
principles of equity to apply, because LLC managers are clearly fiduciaries, and because 
fiduciaries owe the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, the LLC Act starts with the default 
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 As Delaware Chief Justice Strine explained in Auriga Capital v. 
Gatz Properties,46 sitting then as the Chancellor:  
It seems obvious that, under traditional principles of equity, a man-
ager of an LLC would qualify as a fiduciary . . . [.] “[A] fiduciary 
relationship is a situation where one person reposes special trust in 
and reliance on the judgment of another or where a special duty ex-
ists on the part of one person to protect the interests of another.” 
Corporate directors, general partners and trustees are analogous 
examples of those who . . . owe a “special duty.” Equity distinguishes 
fiduciary relationships from straightforward commercial arrange-
ments where there is no expectation that one party will act in the 
interests of the other. . . . The manager of an LLC has more than an 
arms-length, contractual relationship with the members of the LLC. 
Rather, the manager is vested with discretionary power to manage 
the business of the LLC.47  
Therefore, the then-chancellor concluded, “because LLC managers are 
clearly fiduciaries, . . . the LLC Act starts with the default that man-
agers of LLCs owe enforceable fiduciary duties.”48 
C.   Freedom of Contract and the Limits on Equity 
 Although Delaware law has imported traditional equitable princi-
ples, including fiduciary duties, into the LLC context, Delaware’s LLC 
statute also makes clear that those equitable principles are subordi-
nate to the “freedom of contract and to the enforceability of [LLC] 
                                                                                                                                        
that managers of LLCs owe enforceable fiduciary duties.”); Feeley, 62 A.3d at 661 (Laster, 
V.C.) (“[The] Delaware [LLC Act] contemplates that equitable fiduciary duties will apply by 
default to a manager or managing member of a Delaware LLC.”); Phillips v. Hove, No. 3644–
VCL, 2011 WL 4404034, at *24 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2011) (Laster, V.C.) (“Unless limited or 
eliminated in the entity’s operating agreement, the member-managers of a Delaware [LLC] 
owe traditional fiduciary duties to the LLC and its members.”); Atlas Energy, 2010 WL 
4273122, at *6 (Noble, V.C.) (“[I]n the absence of explicit provisions in a [LLC] agreement to 
the contrary, the traditional fiduciary duties owed by corporate directors and controlling 
shareholders apply in the [LLC] context.”); Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Parsons, V.C.) 
(“[U]nless the LLC agreement in a manager-managed LLC explicitly expands, restricts, or 
eliminates traditional fiduciary duties, managers owe those duties to the LLC and its mem-
bers and controlling members owe those duties to minority members.”); Bay Ctr., 2009 WL 
1124451, at *8 (Strine, V.C.) (holding that “in the absence of a contrary provision in the LLC 
agreement, the manager of an LLC owes the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care 
to the members of the LLC”). 
 46. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d 
sub nom. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).  
 47. Id. at 850-51 (footnote omitted); accord id. at 855-56 n.65 (“[M]anagers of LLCs owe 
fiduciary duties because they fit within the classic definition of a fiduciary of a business 
enterprise under traditional principles of equity.”); see also Feeley, 62 A.3d at 661-63 (Laster, 
V.C.) (holding that those who have discretionary power and control over an LLC owe tradi-
tional fiduciary duties in the absence of an agreement to the contrary). 
 48. Auriga, 40 A.3d at 851. 
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agreements.”49 This freedom of contract includes the freedom to pri-
vately order all aspects of an LLC’s internal governance,50 including 
the fiduciary duties that might otherwise apply to those vested with 
control over the business.51 To emphasize this point, the LLC statute 
provides that:  
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or 
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a [LLC] or to 
another member . . . , the member’s or manager’s or other person’s 
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in 
the [LLC] agreement . . . .52 
Thus, while fiduciary duties are generally mandatory under corporate 
law—a corporate charter cannot eliminate the fiduciary duties of its 
officers and directors53—these duties are simply default rules for 
                                                                                                                                        
 49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016). 
 50. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999) (“The [LLC] 
Act can be characterized as a ‘flexible statute’ because it generally permits members to en-
gage in private ordering with substantial freedom of contract to govern their  
relationship . . . .” (quoting 1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS, § 1.12, at 1.37-.38 (1999))).   
 51. See Manesh, Market for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 225-34 (discussing the freedom 
of contract permitted under LLC law regarding fiduciary duties).   
 52. § 18-1101(c) (emphasis added). 
 53. As I have elaborated elsewhere:  
At most, corporations may eliminate managerial liability arising from breaches 
of the fiduciary duty of care and carve out limited exceptions to the corporate 
opportunity doctrine. Corporations cannot eliminate the substantive obligations 
of the fiduciary duty of care; cannot eliminate the substantive obligations of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty or any liability arising from the breach of that duty; 
cannot eliminate the corporate opportunity doctrine altogether; cannot insulate 
all interested transactions from exacting entire fairness review; cannot eliminate 
so-called Revlon duties; and cannot protect managerial decisions from judicial 
scrutiny under the intermediate Unocal standard of review. Delaware alterna-
tive entities [including LLCs], however, can do all of these things. 
Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence 
from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 561-62 (2012) [hereinafter Manesh, 
Contractual Freedom] (footnotes omitted); see also Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and 
the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (2009) [hereinafter Manesh, Legal Asym-
metry] (questioning this dichotomy in corporate versus alternative entity law in the context 
of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships).  
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LLCs.54 Fiduciary duties will apply only in the absence of terms in an 
LLC agreement modifying or eliminating such duties.55  
 This freedom of contract extends not only to fiduciary duties, but 
also to other equitable principles that would ordinarily apply to LLCs. 
For example, Delaware’s LLC statute recognizes the standing of LLC 
members to bring a derivative suit on behalf of an LLC,56 but the Del-
aware Supreme Court has held that the statutorily mandated freedom 
of contract includes the freedom to eliminate the derivative standing 
of members.57 Likewise, although the Delaware LLC statute recog-
nizes the right of LLC members to seek judicial dissolution “whenever 
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business” of the LLC,58 
the chancery court has held that this right to judicial dissolution may 
be waived in the terms of an LLC agreement.59   
 As a consequence, Delaware LLC law enables parties to draft agree-
ments that substantially constrain the role of equity in LLCs. In this 
respect, Delaware LLC law stands in stark contrast to not only its cor-
porate law,60 but also the LLC law of other states, in particular those 
that have adopted the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
                                                                                                                                        
 54. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 
2010) (noting that while Delaware’s corporate statute “authorizes a corporation to adopt pro-
visions limiting liability for a director’s breach of the duty of care, [Delaware’s LLC statute] 
goes further by allowing broad exculpation of all liabilities for breach of fiduciary duties—
including the duty of loyalty” (footnote omitted)); Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 
2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2009) (noting that “[w]hile such a provision [lim-
iting the fiduciary duty of loyalty] is permissible under the Delaware [LLC] Act and the 
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, where freedom of contract is the guid-
ing and overriding principle, it is expressly forbidden by the [Delaware corporate statute]”). 
 55. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 568-69 (describing how an 
LLC or limited partnership agreement may eliminate fiduciary duties wholesale or modify 
only limited aspects of fiduciary duties by including terms inconsistent with the application 
of such duties); see also cases cited supra note 45 (holding that fiduciary duties apply as a 
default in LLCs in the absence of provisions in an LLC agreement to the contrary). 
 56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1001 (2016). 
 57. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 295 (Del. 1999) (“We hold 
that, because the policy of the Act is to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom 
of contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements, the parties may contract to avoid 
the applicability of Section[] . . . 18-1001[which codifies the derivative standing of  
LLC members].”). 
 58. See § 18-802. 
 59. See R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 
WL 3846318, at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008).  
 60. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
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(ULLCA)61 or the increasingly popular Revised Uniform Limited Lia-
bility Company Act (RULLCA).62 Under both the ULLCA and 
RULLCA, the ability of parties to contractually tailor fiduciary duties 
is statutorily limited.63 Generally, an LLC agreement under either uni-
form statute cannot lawfully place “manifestly unreasonable” 
restrictions on the fiduciary duty of loyalty or care.64 Indeed, the uni-
form LLC statutes identify a number of mandatory provisions that 
cannot be eliminated by the terms of an LLC agreement.65 These man-
datory provisions include the rights of LLC members to bring a 
derivative lawsuit on behalf of the LLC,66 as well as the right to seek 
judicial dissolution.67 
 As result of these statutory differences, courts in jurisdictions gov-
erned by statutes following the ULLCA or RULLCA retain significant 
equitable discretion to ensure fairness and justice in LLC cases 
through the application of the uniform statutes’ mandatory standards 
like “manifestly unreasonable.”68 By contrast, in Delaware, where an 
LLC agreement waives or displaces traditional equitable principles, 
the courts have found themselves robotically enforcing the terms of the 
agreement, without ever seriously questioning whether such enforce-
ment is fair, reasonable, or just given the circumstances presented.69 
Perhaps nowhere is this contrast more vivid than in cases involving 
alleged breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Where those vested 
                                                                                                                                        
 61. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996) [hereinafter ULLCA], 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ullca96.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/27TP-2ATY]. 
 62. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) [hereinafter 
RULLCA], http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ 
ullca_final_06rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8H6-DK8C]. 
 63. See ULLCA § 103(b)(2)-(3); RULLCA § 110(d). 
 64. The ULLCA actually treats the two fiduciary duties slightly differently. Under the 
ULLCA, LLC agreements cannot place “manifestly unreasonable” restrictions on the fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty or “unreasonably reduce” the fiduciary duty of care. See  
ULLCA § 103(b)(2) (addressing loyalty); id. § 103(b)(3) (addressing care). The RULLCA ad-
dresses both fiduciary duties with the same legal standard. The RULLCA provides LLC 
agreements cannot impose “manifestly unreasonable” limitations on either fiduciary duty of 
loyalty or care. See RULLCA § 110(d); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and 
Unincorporated Business Entities: In Defense of the “Manifestly Unreasonable” Standard, 
41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 431-34 (2006) (explaining the “manifestly unreasonable” standard). 
 65. See ULLCA § 103(b); RULLCA § 110(c). 
 66. See RULLCA § 110(c)(9). The ULLCA does not have a similar provision. See  
ULLCA § 103(b). 
 67. See ULLCA § 103(b)(6); RULLCA § 110(c)(7). 
 68. See Loewenstein, supra note 64, at 440 (conceding that the “manifestly unreasona-
ble” standard “is indeed uncertain, ambiguous, nebulous, and . . . [lacks] clearly defined 
limits”). Other mandatory provisions of the uniform LLC statutes likewise reserve room for 
the exercise of a court’s equitable discretion, including the standards of “oppressive” or “not 
reasonably practicable to carry on” the LLC’s business, either of which may serve as a basis 
for triggering judicial dissolution. See RULLCA §§ 110(c)(7), 701(a)(4)-(5). 
 69. See supra note 6. 
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with legal control over the LLC have engaged in bad faith conduct or 
self-dealing at the expense of the business or its owners, Delaware’s 
LLC statute and case law suggest that, in deference to the freedom of 
contract, the courts are powerless to do equity in the face of an LLC 
agreement waiving or displacing traditional fiduciary duties. It is this 
basic understanding of LLC law—the supremacy of contract over eq-
uity—that Carlisle subverts. 
III.   THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR EQUITY 
 Despite Delaware’s unequivocal embrace of freedom of contract in 
statute and case law, the role of equity in LLCs is not as settled as it 
might seem. Lurking in Delaware’s state constitution, there is a strong 
argument to be made that courts are not left powerless to do equity, 
even when presented with an LLC agreement that purports to elimi-
nate fiduciary duties or curb other traditionally equitable principles. 
Section A explains this argument. And Section B describes how the 
Delaware courts have responded to it. As Section B explains, the Del-
aware courts have now twice addressed the constitutional basis for 
equity in LLCs. But those two cases—Bax and Carlisle—reached op-
posite conclusions on the constitutional issue. Consequently, today, 
the role of equity in LLC law remains unsettled. 
A.   Equity Jurisdiction Under the Delaware Constitution 
 The constitutional case for equity in LLCs was first voiced in a 2011 
article by Professor Lyman Johnson.70 In short, Johnson argued the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s equitable powers are constitutionally pro-
tected and, therefore, cannot be reduced by legislative statute or 
private agreement.71 
 Johnson’s argument is based on the Delaware Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of Article IV, Section 10 of the state’s current 
constitution.72 That section provides, in relevant part, that the Dela-
ware Chancery Court “shall have all the jurisdiction and powers 
vested by the laws of this State in the Court of Chancery.”73 This lan-
guage traces its origins back to the Delaware Constitution of 1792, 
which was the first time the state constitutionalized the jurisdiction of 
its chancery court.74 Interpreting this language in light of its complex 
history, the Delaware Supreme Court held in DuPont v. DuPont that 
                                                                                                                                        
 70. See generally Johnson, supra note 22, at 701-03.  
 71. See id. at 702-03. 
 72. See id. at 716-18; see also DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.  
 73. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10. 
 74. See Dupont v. Dupont, 85 A.2d 724, 728 (Del. 1951). 
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the state constitution vests the Delaware Chancery Court with equi-
table jurisdiction equivalent to that of the High Court of Chancery in 
Great Britain at the time of the separation of the American colonies.75 
More importantly, the supreme court also held that the state legisla-
ture is constitutionally prohibited from restricting the chancery court’s 
equity jurisdiction to less than this “irreducible minimum” as first set 
in 1792.76  
 But, as Johnson argues, Delaware’s LLC statute purports to do just 
that.77 The doctrine of fiduciary duty was well established in equity at 
the time of this nation’s founding.78 Therefore, Johnson concludes, “un-
der the reasoning of DuPont, the [Delaware] Chancery Court’s 
jurisdiction over fiduciary duty claims [can]not be divested through leg-
islation enacted by the Delaware General Assembly.”79 To be sure, 
Delaware’s LLC statute does not directly purport to divest the chancery 
court’s equity jurisdiction to recognize and enforce fiduciary claims. But 
it does so indirectly. By purporting to authorize contractual restrictions 
or elimination of fiduciary duties,80 the state legislature attempts to em-
power private individuals to do what the legislature cannot do directly.81 
“In effect, the General Assembly is aggrandizing to itself, and private 
parties, the power to decide what the Delaware judiciary can and cannot 
do” with respect to fiduciary relationships.82 
                                                                                                                                        
 75. See id. at 728-30; see also Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 849 (summarizing 
the holding of Dupont). 
 76. See Dupont, 85 A.2d at 729 (holding that “the general equity jurisdiction of the 
Court of Chancery is measured in terms of the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court 
of Chancery of Great Britain and is a constitutional grant not subject to legislative curtail-
ment . . . .”); id. (interpreting the state constitution “to establish . . . the irreducible minimum 
of the judiciary. . . . [,] secur[ing] for the protection of the people an adequate judicial system 
and remov[ing] it from the vagaries of legislative whim”); accord CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 
1037, 1044 (Del. 2011) (“The Delaware Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from 
limiting the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to less than the general equity ju-
risdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain existing at the time of our 
separation from the Mother Country.” (citing Dupont, 85 A.2d 724)); In re Carlisle Etcetera 
LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 602 (Del. Ch. 2015) (paraphrasing Dupont’s holding that the state con-
stitution “vested in the Court of Chancery ‘all the general equity jurisdiction of the High 
Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the colonies . . . .’ 
[and that] the General Assembly cannot enact legislation that reduces this court’s jurisdic-
tion below the constitutionally established minimum . . . .” (quoting DuPont, 85 A.2d at 727)). 
 77. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 711-18. 
 78. See id. at 711-12, 718 (citing Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch.)).   
 79. Id. at 718 (footnote omitted). 
 80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2016). 
 81. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 713-14. To be sure, there is nothing to suggest that 
in enacting this provision of the LLC statute, the Delaware General Assembly understood 
and intended to circumvent the constitutional limits on its legislative power. Rather, in en-
acting the provision, the General Assembly appears to have unknowingly superseded its 
constitutional authority regarding equity jurisdiction. 
 82. Id. at 714. 
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 The upshot of Johnson’s analysis is that, despite Delaware’s em-
brace of freedom of contract, as a constitutional matter, Delaware 
courts retain their traditional equitable power to recognize fiduciary 
relationships and impose fiduciary standards.83 That power means 
that Delaware courts need not blithely defer to terms in an LLC agree-
ment purporting to limit or eliminate fiduciary duties.84 Instead, the 
chancery court must, in each case, ascertain, as an equitable matter, 
whether to enforce the terms of an LLC agreement given the circum-
stances with which it is presented.85  
 Although Johnson’s article centers on the enforceability of fiduciary 
waivers,86 his analysis has the same force anytime the LLC statute or 
an agreement purports to limit or eliminate a facet of the chancery 
court’s traditional equitable powers. So, it is interesting that in the two 
LLC cases where the Delaware courts have addressed the scope of the 
chancery court’s constitutionally protected equity jurisdiction, the 
courts were focused on other, non-fiduciary facets of that jurisdiction: 
derivative standing and judicial dissolution.  
B.   Divergent Judicial Views  
 Prior to the publication of Johnson’s 2011 article, no Delaware court 
had ever considered the implications of the chancery court’s constitu-
tionally protected equity jurisdiction as applied to LLCs—presumably 
because no litigant had previously raised the issue. But immediately 
after his article’s publication, the plaintiff in CML V, LLC v. Bax87 
made the constitutional argument for the first time on appeal before 
the Delaware Supreme Court.88  
1.   Bax 
 In Bax, the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with a narrow legal 
question: whether the state’s LLC statute precludes derivative stand-
ing for an LLC creditor. The plaintiff in Bax, a junior secured creditor 
of an insolvent LLC, sought to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                                        
 83. See id. at 718.   
 84. See id. at 718-19.  
 85. See id. (arguing that, despite the authorization of fiduciary waivers in the LLC stat-
ute, the chancery court retains the “continuing responsibility to ask—in every case—
whether, in equity, [the court] should or should not enforce the contractual waiver”).  
 86. Although Johnson limits the scope of his analysis to fiduciary waivers, he does apply 
it beyond the specific context of LLCs to include fiduciary waivers in general partnership 
and limited partnership agreements. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 706-07, 719. 
 87. 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011). 
 88. At the chancery court, the plaintiff did not raise, and the court did not consider, the 
potential constitutional issue implicated by the derivative standing provision in the LLC 
statute. See CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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LLC against the LLC’s officers for breaching their fiduciary duties 
owed to the LLC.89 As a result of these breaches, the plaintiff-creditor 
asserted, the LLC was forced into liquidation and, ultimately, failed to 
repay the debt owed to the plaintiff.90  
 The defendant-officers sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s derivative 
claims, arguing that the plaintiff-creditor lacked standing under Del-
aware’s LLC statute to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the LLC.91 
Specifically, the LLC statute provides that in a derivative action, “the 
plaintiff must be a member or an assignee of a [LLC] interest at the 
time of bringing the action.”92 This statutory language, the defendants 
contended, precluded the court from recognizing derivative standing 
for any other parties, including LLC creditors like the plaintiff.93 
 The plaintiff countered that such a literal interpretation of the LLC 
statute—limiting derivative standing exclusively to LLC members and 
assignees—would render the statute unconstitutional under the state 
constitution because the statute would divest the chancery court of its 
traditional equitable power to recognize derivative standing for other 
parties where justice required it.94 To make this point, the plaintiff-
creditor pointed to Delaware corporate law precedent.95 Delaware’s 
corporate statute recognizes the right of only stockholders to bring a 
“derivative suit”;96 yet Delaware courts have also extended derivative 
standing to non-stockholder creditors when a corporation becomes in-
solvent.97 This right of non-stockholder creditors to bring a derivative 
action stems not from any provision in Delaware’s corporate statute, 
but from the courts’ equitable power. As the Delaware Supreme Court 
explained in a decision prior to Bax, a “corporation’s insolvency ‘makes 
the creditors the principal constituency injured by any fiduciary 
breaches that diminish the firm’s value.’ Therefore, equitable consid-
erations give creditors standing to pursue derivative claims against 
the directors of an insolvent corporation” to prevent failures  
of justice.98 
                                                                                                                                        
 89. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1039-40. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 1040. 
 92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1002 (2016) (emphasis added).   
 93. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1040. 
 94. See id. at 1043-44. 
 95. See id. at 1042. 
 96. tit. 8, § 327 (2016). 
 97. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 
(Del. 2007) (“[T]he creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative 
claims against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties.”). 
 98. Id. at 101-02 (quoting Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 
n.67 (Del. Ch. 2004)). 
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 In Bax, however, the Delaware Supreme Court sidestepped any po-
tential constitutional problem by rejecting the notion that equity plays 
a similar role in the LLC context.99 To support this conclusion, the high 
court sharply distinguished LLCs from corporations. The court 
acknowledged that at the time of this nation’s independence, the equi-
table right of a corporation’s stockholders to bring a derivative lawsuit 
on behalf of a corporation was recognized by equity in order to prevent 
failures of justice.100 And because derivative standing is itself an equi-
table doctrine, the court agreed that the doctrine may be extended as 
equity requires to address new circumstances,101 as was the case in-
volving the creditors of an insolvent corporation.102 Therefore, the 
court conceded, citing Dupont, “the Delaware Constitution prohibits 
the General Assembly from limiting the Court of Chancery’s jurisdic-
tion over the extension of corporate derivative standing.”103   
 Importantly, however, the court observed, the plaintiff’s claim in-
volved an LLC, not a corporation. Unlike corporations, LLCs did not 
exist at the time of the American colonies’ separation from Britain.104 
“The corporate form existed in 1792, but LLCs came into existence in 
Delaware in 1992” when Delaware first adopted its LLC statute.105 
Therefore, the court ruled, LLCs fall outside of the chancery court’s 
constitutionally vested equity jurisdiction.106 As a result, any rights, 
remedies, or obligations associated with LLCs, including the right of 
derivative standing asserted by the plaintiff, must arise not in equity, 
but from the LLC statute or the agreement governing the LLC.107 
 By placing LLCs beyond the chancery court’s equitable powers, Bax 
avoided any potential constitutional issues raised by the LLC statute. 
Because LLCs did not exist at the time of this nation’s founding, “noth-
ing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assembly 
from limiting the scope of LLC derivative standing.”108 Less than four 
                                                                                                                                        
 99. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044-46. 
 100. See id. at 1044; see also Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 201 (Del. 2008) (discussing 
the history of derivative standing in equity). 
 101. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044.  
 102. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045. 
 104. See id. (“[T]his case deals not with a corporation but with a statutorily created 
LLC—a business entity that did not exist in 1792.”). 
 105. Id.  
 106. See id. (holding that because LLCs are “a business entity that did not exist in  
1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assembly from lim-
iting the scope of [the equitable doctrine of] . . . derivative standing” in LLCs). 
 107. See id. (“[W]hen adjudicating the rights, remedies, and obligations associated with 
Delaware LLCs, courts must look to the LLC Act because it is only the statute that creates 
those rights, remedies, and obligations.” (emphasis added)). 
 108. Id. 
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years later, the chancery court in In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC reached 
a starkly different conclusion on the constitutional question.  
2.   Carlisle 
 As in Bax, the court in Carlisle faced a relatively narrow legal 
question: whether the state’s LLC statute precludes a non-member as-
signee of an LLC interest from seeking judicial dissolution of an LLC. 
In Carlisle, the assignee of an LLC interest had petitioned the court 
for judicial dissolution of the LLC, alleging the LLC’s “board of direc-
tors,” who collectively acted as the LLC’s manager, were irresolvably 
deadlocked on all key decisions.109 Initially formed as a two-member 
LLC, one of the two members had since assigned its LLC interest to a 
wholly-owned subsidiary.110 As a result of that assignment, the as-
signor lost its status as a member.111 More consequentially, because 
the assignee-subsidiary was never admitted as a member by formal 
action of the remaining LLC member in the manner dictated by stat-
ute,112 the subsidiary became a mere assignee of an LLC interest and 
not a member.113   
 As noted previously,114 Delaware’s LLC statute explicitly authorizes 
the judicial dissolution of an LLC upon irresolvable deadlock “when-
ever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business [of the 
LLC] in conformity with a [LLC] agreement.”115 Importantly, however, 
judicial dissolution is only permitted under the statute “[o]n applica-
tion by or for a member or manager.”116 Seizing on this statutory 
language, the sole remaining LLC member sought to dismiss the peti-
tion for judicial dissolution, arguing that the petition was brought by 
an assignee and not “a member or manager” as statutorily required.117 
 The chancery court, per Vice Chancellor Laster, agreed with the 
LLC’s sole remaining member that the assignee could not petition for 
judicial dissolution under the LLC statutory text.118 Nonetheless, the 
                                                                                                                                        
 109. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 594 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
 110. See id. at 594-96. 
 111. See id. at 598; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3) (2016) (“A member 
ceases to be a member and to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member 
upon assignment of all of the member’s [LLC] interest.”). 
 112. § 18-702(a) (“The assignee of a member’s [LLC] interest shall have no right to par-
ticipate in the management of the business and affairs of a [LLC] except . . . upon the vote 
or consent of all of the members of the [LLC].”). 
 113. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 598-601. 
 114. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 115. § 18-802. 
 116. Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 597. 
 118. Id. at 601. 
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vice chancellor ruled the assignee could seek judicial dissolution as an 
equitable matter.119  
 To support this conclusion, the vice chancellor began by observing 
that the judicial power to order dissolution of a solvent business is it-
self a power that originated in equity.120 Therefore, the vice chancellor 
reasoned, as a constitutional matter, the LLC statute cannot limit the 
court’s traditional equitable power to order dissolution in circum-
stances where justice dictated.121 If the LLC statute were interpreted 
otherwise, to “provide the exclusive method of dissolving an LLC,” 
then it “would raise serious constitutional questions” because the stat-
ute would unconstitutionally “divest this court of a significant aspect 
of its traditional equitable jurisdiction.”122   
 By holding that the court’s constitutionally vested equitable power 
to order dissolution extends to LLCs, the vice chancellor recognized 
the tension created with Bax.123 After all, in Bax, the supreme court 
asserted that LLCs are not subject to the chancery’s traditional equi-
table powers.124 Under Bax, the only rights of an LLC party are those 
that arise under the LLC statute or governing contract, not in eq-
uity.125 To address that tension, the vice chancellor baldly refuted what 
he described as Bax’s “radical form of constitutional originalism”126: 
Although this court’s equitable jurisdiction is measured by the “the 
general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great 
Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the colonies,” the Del-
aware Supreme Court has [in decisions prior to Bax] recognized that 
the scope of that jurisdiction is not limited by the extent of British 
                                                                                                                                        
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 602 (“If [the LLC statutory provision] did purport to establish an exclusive 
means to obtain dissolution and override a significant portion of this court’s traditional eq-
uitable jurisdiction, then the validity of that aspect of the provision would raise serious 
constitutional questions.”).  
 122. Id. at 601-02; see also Jason C. Jowers & Meghan A. Adams, The Increasing Role of 
Equity in Delaware LLC Litigation, 2015 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 3 (“According to the court [in 
Carlisle], if [the LLC statute] could be interpreted to be the exclusive method of judicial 
dissolution, it would likely violate the Delaware Constitution.”). 
 123. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 603 n.3 (citing Bax as conflicting precedent). 
 124. See CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011) (holding that because LLCs 
are “a business entity that did not exist in 1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution 
precludes the General Assembly from limiting the scope of LLC derivative standing”). 
 125. See id. (“[W]hen adjudicating the rights, remedies, and obligations associated with 
Delaware LLCs, courts must look to the LLC Act because it is only the statute that creates 
those rights, remedies, and obligations.” (emphasis added)). 
 126. Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 603 n.3 (“Excluding LLCs and other post-eighteenth century 
entities from the domain of equity based on when the governing statutes were adopted would 
represent a radical form of constitutional originalism that even the strongest judicial propo-
nents of that doctrine have not embraced.”). 
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scientific, technological, and legal knowledge at the time of the 
handover. 
. . . . 
 It is the “complete system” of equity that this court inherited and 
administers, not the temporally specific subject matter of eight-
eenth century cases.127 
Given these considerations, the vice chancellor concluded: “I cannot 
accept the contention that because the nascent practice of entity law 
as it existed at the time of the colonies’ separation had not yet envi-
sioned LLCs, they fall outside the domain of equity.”128  
3.   Irreconcilable Conflict Between Bax and Carlisle   
 Both Bax and Carlisle agree on Dupont’s basic interpretation of the 
state constitution: The chancery court’s equitable powers are constitu-
tionally vested and cannot be legislatively reduced to less than what 
those powers were in 1792.129 Where the two cases diverge, however, 
is on the question of whether the constitutionally vested jurisdiction 
to apply equitable doctrines extends to LLCs and other business forms 
not yet in existence in 1792.130 
 This divergence is critical. If Carlisle is correct that the chancery 
court’s equity jurisdiction extends to newer business forms, then the 
Delaware state constitution has far-reaching implications for LLCs. 
Under the state’s constitution, the chancery court’s traditional equita-
ble powers—including the power to grant derivative standing, order 
dissolution, or to recognize fiduciary relationships and enforce fiduci-
ary duties—cannot be limited by the LLC statute or a private 
                                                                                                                                        
 127. Id. at 602 (internal citations omitted). 
 128. Id. at 603. 
 129. See Dupont v. Dupont, 85 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951); accord Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044 
(Del. 2011) (“The Delaware Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from limiting the 
equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to less than the general equity jurisdiction of the 
High Court of Chancery of Great Britain existing at the time of our separation from the 
Mother Country.”(citing Dupont, 85 A.2d at 729)); Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 602 (paraphrasing 
Dupont’s holding to be that the state constitution “vested in the Court of Chancery ‘all the 
general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior 
to the separation of the colonies . . .’ [and] that the General Assembly cannot enact legislation 
that reduces this court’s jurisdiction below the constitutionally established minimum”). 
 130. Compare Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045 (holding that because LLCs are “a business entity 
that did not exist in 1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General 
Assembly from limiting the scope of [the equitable doctrine of] derivative standing” in LLCs), 
with Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 603 (“I cannot accept the contention that because the nascent 
practice of entity law as it existed at the time of the colonies’ separation had not yet envi-
sioned LLCs, they fall outside the domain of equity.”). 
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agreement authorized by that statute.131 Bax avoids these difficult is-
sues by holding that the chancery court’s traditional equitable powers, 
vested since 1792, are simply frozen in time, inapplicable to LLCs and 
other newer business entities not yet conceived at the time of this  
nation’s founding.132 
 Understandably, one might be tempted to distinguish Carlisle from 
Bax, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional issues that Carlisle 
raises. But as to the core constitutional question, such attempts are 
unavailing. For example, one might attempt to reconcile Carlisle with 
Bax by distinguishing the specific statutory provisions at issue in each 
case. The relevant statutory provision in Bax was unambiguous that 
in a derivative action “the plaintiff must be a member or an as-
signee.”133 As the high court noted, the word “must” is “mandatory and 
exclusive,” and therefore, the statutory language is “clear [and] une-
quivocal.”134 In contrast, the relevant statutory provision in Carlisle—
authorizing judicial dissolution “[o]n application by or for a member or 
manager”135—did not purport to be exclusive, leaving room for the 
court to supplement the statute with equitable rights and remedies.136  
 But the problem with distinguishing Carlisle from Bax based on the 
statutory language at issue in each case is that the statutory language 
ignores the underlying constitutional question. The underlying consti-
tutional question is whether the chancery court’s equitable powers 
vested in 1792 apply to LLCs. If so, then the state constitution pre-
cludes any legislative attempt to abridge the chancery court’s 
jurisdiction to apply and enforce traditional equitable principles in 
LLC cases. Carlisle and Bax come to conflicting conclusions on this 
basic question.137 The relative ambiguity or indefiniteness of the stat-
utory provision has no relevance to the constitutional question.138   
 For similar reasons, one cannot distinguish Carlisle from Bax by 
pointing to the relative equitable considerations implicated in each case, 
                                                                                                                                        
 131. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045 (holding that because LLCs are “a business entity that did 
not exist in 1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assembly 
from limiting the scope of LLC derivative standing”). 
 133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1002 (2016) (emphasis added). 
 134. Bax, 28 A.3d at 1041-42. 
 135. § 18-802. 
 136. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 601 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“Section 18–802 
does not state that it establishes an exclusive means to obtain dissolution, nor does it contain 
language overriding this court’s equitable authority.”). 
 137. See supra note 130. 
     138.  For this reason, the Delaware Supreme Court’s assertion in Bax that the chancery 
court’s constitutionally vested “equitable power cannot override the LLC Act’s express provi-
sions” is illogical. Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045-46. If the power is one that is constitutionally protected, 
then it cannot be legislatively or contractually abrogated. 
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as Vice Chancellor Laster attempted to do.139 In his Carlisle opinion, 
the vice chancellor noted that unlike the LLC creditor in Bax, who had 
ample adequate remedies at law and therefore did not deserve the pro-
tection of equity, the assignee of an LLC interest in Carlisle was left 
powerless at law to affect change in the LLC.140 This point is relevant 
because, even if LLCs are subject to the chancery court’s equity jurisdic-
tion, it is axiomatic that equity will not intervene where there exists an 
adequate legal remedy.141 But the question of whether there exists an 
adequate legal remedy in any given case is separate and distinct from 
the underlying constitutional question of whether the chancery court’s 
                                                                                                                                        
 139. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 604-05. 
 140. See id. (citing Bax, 28 A.3d at 1046). 
 141. See Chavin v. H.H. Rosin & Co., 246 A.2d 921, 922 (Del. 1968) (“It is, of course, axiomatic 
that Equity has no jurisdiction over a controversy for which there is a complete and adequate remedy 
at law.”); accord Bax, 28 A.3d at 1046 (“Even if the Court of Chancery did have the jurisdiction to 
extend LLC derivative standing . . . it should exercise that jurisdiction only absent an adequate rem-
edy at law.”). Although Chavin, which is cited by Bax, suggests that “equity has no jurisdiction” 
where there is an adequate remedy at law, this is in fact an example of the type of conflation dis-
cussed infra note 142, confounding (i) “equity jurisdiction” and (ii) a principle of equity jurisprudence. 
In fact, for claims asserting purely equitable rights, there exists exclusive equity jurisdiction irre-
spective of whether there is any adequate remedy at law. See infra note 142; see also Harman v. 
Masoneilan Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 498-99, 499 n.22 (Del. 1982) (holding that a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty falls within exclusive equity jurisdiction, and therefore, it is irrelevant whether there 
is an adequate remedy available at law); Glanding v. Indus. Trust Co., 45 A.2d 553, 556 (Del. 1945) 
(holding that “no positive restriction or limitation of the exercise of [the chancery court’s] equitable 
jurisdiction resulted” from the existence of an adequate remedy at law); Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 
399, 402 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen. C.) (holding that a claim asserting an equitable right, such as a claim 
based on fiduciary duty, is subject to equity jurisdiction irrespective of the remedy sought in equity 
or otherwise available at law); Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 998 (Del. Ch. 1981) (Harnett, 
V.C.) (“Where the relationship between the parties imposes an equitable obligation to account, equity 
has always taken jurisdiction over the controversy, even where there may be an adequate remedy at 
law.”). For this reason, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that title 10, section 342 of the Dela-
ware Code—which provides that “[t]he Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine 
any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute”—“is ‘a mere declara-
tion of the ancient rule of equity’ precluding equitable relief [and] . . . .‘being a mere declaration of 
the ancient rule of equity, neither grants nor divests equity of any jurisdiction.’ ” In re Arzuaga-
Guevara, 794 A.2d 579, 586 (Del. 2001) (quoting Boxer, 429 A.2d at 998). 
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equity jurisdiction applies to LLCs.142 As noted before, on this underly-
ing constitutional question, Bax and Carlisle disagree.143  
 In short, attempts to reconcile Bax and Carlisle are unconvincing. 
Instead, the two cases represent an unresolved conflict in Delaware 
law as to the role of equity in LLCs. How this conflict is ultimately 
                                                                                                                                        
 142. Equity jurisdiction means the power of the chancery court to hear and decide certain 
kinds or classes of actions according to the principles of equity jurisprudence, which decisions 
may involve either the determination of an equitable right or the granting of an equitable rem-
edy. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 130, at 176. Whether that power should be exercised in any 
given case is subject to the principles of equity jurisprudence. Professor Pomeroy long ago be-
moaned that “[e]quity jurisdiction is distinct from equity jurisprudence” and the “constant 
tendency to confound these two subjects . . . . has been productive of much confusion.” Id. § 131, 
at 179-80. “[E]quity jurisdiction may exist over a case, although it is one which the doctrines of 
equity jurisprudence forbid any relief to be given, or any right to be maintained.” Id. §131, at 
180; see also id. §§ 131-33, at 179-82 (criticizing the conflation of equity jurisdiction with equity 
jurisprudence and the oversimplification that equity jurisdiction applies only in cases where 
there is a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law); id. §§ 217-18, 267-68 (same).   
To appreciate this distinction, it can be helpful to separate exclusive equity jurisdic-
tion from concurrent equity jurisdiction. Exclusive equity jurisdiction covers cases where 
equity recognizes and protects a right not otherwise recognized at law; the right is purely 
equitable in nature. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 42, at 102. The right to bring a derivative 
suit on behalf of a business entity, as was the case in Bax, is a good example of a right 
recognized by equity and, therefore, within the chancery court’s exclusive equity jurisdiction. 
Concurrent equity jurisdiction, by contrast, covers cases where equity protects a legal right 
with an equitable remedy, because the remedy available at law for the protection of that 
right is inadequate. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 42, at 102; accord Harman v. Masoneilan 
Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 497 (Del. 1982) (defining the chancery court’s exclusive equity ju-
risdiction as “jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity” and its 
concurrent equity jurisdiction as “jurisdiction over claims for which the remedy available at 
law is insufficient”). For example, a suit seeking enforcement of a contract by specific perfor-
mance, which is an equitable remedy, falls within the concurrent equity jurisdiction of the 
chancery court.  
The inadequacy of available legal remedies is the foundation—an essential element—
for concurrent equity jurisdiction. See Glanding, 45 A.2d at 559 (“[T]he very foundation of 
concurrent jurisdiction is predicated upon the inadequacy of the remedy at law.”); POMEROY, 
supra note 1, § 139, at 192, § 173, at 233-34, § 217, at 367. If there exists an adequate legal 
remedy, there is no concurrent equity jurisdiction. By contrast, “the exclusive jurisdiction of 
equity does not rest upon the inadequacy of legal remedies.” POMEROY, supra note 1, § 173, 
at 234. “[E]xclusive equitable jurisdiction, or the power . . . . to adjudicate upon the subject-
matters coming within that jurisdiction, exists independently of the adequacy or inadequacy 
of the legal remedies obtainable under the circumstances of any particular case.” Id. § 218, 
at 368. Nonetheless, the principles of equity jurisprudence that govern the proper exercise 
of exclusive equity jurisdiction “do also depend in some measure upon the insufficiency and 
inadequacy of the remedies granted by the law.” POMEROY, supra note 1, § 173, at 234; accord 
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 40, at 98-99 (“The existence of an adequate remedy at law 
does not exclude the power of a court of equity to act in the matter, it only makes it improper 
for it to act . . . .”). 
Applied to Bax, it may be the case that as a jurisprudential matter, an LLC creditor 
has adequate remedies at law and therefore is not deserving of the court’s equitable power 
to grant derivative standing. But that is not the same as saying that the court lacks the 
power—the equitable jurisdiction—to recognize and extend LLC derivative standing. 
 143. See supra note 130. 
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resolved will have profound implications for the contract-law founda-
tions of LLC law and practice.  
IV.   THE RESURGENCE OF EQUITY? 
 Does Carlisle signal the demise of Bax and a resurgent role for eq-
uity in LLC cases? And if so, will equity upend the statutorily promised 
freedom of contract upon which hundreds of thousands of LLC agree-
ments are based? Only a new decision by the Delaware Supreme Court 
can definitively answer these questions. While Carlisle was decided 
after Bax, meaning that it is the latest pronouncement from the Dela-
ware courts on equity’s role in LLC cases, Carlisle is still a chancery 
court decision. As a strictly legal matter, the chancery court cannot 
overrule supreme court precedent.144   
 Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that Bax may be re-
versed, politely ignored, or distinguished into irrelevance. For one, as 
Section A explains, Bax is based upon a fundamental misapprehension 
of equity. Just as important, Section B describes changes in both Del-
aware’s LLC statute and judiciary since the time Bax was decided that 
further erode the likelihood that Bax will be upheld in future cases.  
A.   Bax’s Misapprehension of Equity  
 Admittedly, the logic of Bax has a seductive simplicity to it: the 
state constitution prohibits the legislature from reducing the chancery 
court’s equitable powers to less than what those powers were in 
1792.145 LLCs did not exist in 1792.146 Therefore, those equitable pow-
ers protected by the state constitution do not extend to LLCs.147  
 This simple logic, however, is built upon a fallacious premise: that 
the equity jurisdiction that was vested in the chancery court in 1792 
is frozen in time and incapable of adapting itself to new constructs or 
                                                                                                                                        
 144. Still, as a practical matter, Carlisle would not be the first time the chancery court 
has reversed the precedent of the high court. See Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The 
Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 54 (2013) [hereinafter Manesh, Damn-
ing Dictum] (describing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
as an example of the Delaware Chancery Court using dicta to overturn antiquated Delaware 
Supreme Court precedent). 
 145. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044 (“The Delaware Constitution prohibits the General As-
sembly from limiting the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to less than the general 
equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain existing at the time of our 
separation from the Mother Country.”). 
 146. Id. at 1045 (“[T]his case deals not with a corporation but with a statutorily created 
LLC—a business entity that did not exist in 1792.”).  
 147. Id. (“Therefore, nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assem-
bly from limiting the scope of [the equitable doctrine of] derivative standing [in LLCs].”). 
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circumstances. This premise fundamentally misapprehends equity ju-
risdiction. The “very nature of equity”148 is to be flexible and 
responsive149—a corrective salve where the strict application of law 
would otherwise serve injustice.150   
 Indeed, in Carlisle, Vice Chancellor Laster emphasized equity’s in-
trinsically adaptive nature,151 quoting extensively from the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Schoon v. Smith,152 decided just three 
years before Bax. In Schoon, a corporate director sought to extend the 
equitable right of derivative standing to enable directors, in addition 
to stockholders, to bring suit on behalf of a corporation.153 In consider-
ing this issue, the supreme court set forth a lengthy and erudite 
discussion on “[t]he [e]xtension of [e]quitable [d]octrine” to new con-
texts.154 The Schoon court observed that “equity jurisdiction ‘has taken 
its shape and its substance from the perceived inadequacies of the com-
mon law and the changing demands of a developing nation.’ ”155 It “has 
an expansive power[] to meet new exigencies.”156 After all, “the final 
object of equity is to do right and justice.”157 Therefore, the Schoon 
court concluded, “[j]udicially-created equitable doctrines may be ex-
tended so long as the extension is consistent with the principles  
of equity.”158 
 Schoon is in accord with other Delaware Supreme Court prece-
dents. Consider, for example Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center,159 
                                                                                                                                        
 148. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 204 (Del. 2008) (describing equity’s ability to 
evolve in order to address new developments and “perceived inadequacies of the common 
law” as “the very nature of equity”); cf. Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 
1348 (Del. 1980) (“[T]he very essence of our system of equity . . . is to render the ‘jurispru-
dence as a whole adequate to the social needs . . . possess[ing] an inherent capacity of 
expansion, so as to keep abreast of each succeeding generation and age.’ ” (quoting POMEROY, 
supra note 1, § 67, at 89)). 
 149. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 819-20 (attributing the longevity of the 
Delaware Chancery Court “to the Court’s ability to adapt principles of equity developed cen-
turies ago to ever-changing economic circumstances and legal relationships”); Oleck, supra 
note 11, at 25 (“[E]quity is, or should be, a living, changing thing, forever adapting itself to 
new conditions . . . . The avoidance of the freezing of law into inflexible rules is one of its 
chief purposes.”). 
 150. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. 
 151. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 602-03 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
 152. 953 A.2d 196 (Del. 2008). 
 153. See id. at 199-200. 
 154. Id. at 204-05. 
 155. Id. at 204 (quoting DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, 1 CORPORATE 
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 2–2[a], at 2–2 (2006)). 
 156. Id. at 206 (quoting 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 45 (Isaac F. Redfield, ed., 9th ed. 1866)). 
 157. Id. at 205 (quoting POMEROY, supra note 1, § 60, at 80). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980). 
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a case in which the petitioner sought a novel form of equitable relief: 
the authority to remove life support from his incurably comatose 
spouse.160 In holding that the chancery court’s historical equitable pow-
ers include the power to grant the extraordinary relief requested, the 
high court stated that “the very essence of our system of equity . . . [is 
its] inherent capacity of expansion, so as to keep abreast of each suc-
ceeding generation and age.”161 Indeed, the Severns court explicitly 
asserted that “nothing in [Dupont] indicates that the [chancery court’s] 
fashioning of [equitable] relief is limited to that which was available 
in 1776.”162 
 The Bax court’s answer to the intrinsically adaptive nature of equity, 
as described in Schoon and Severns, is that it applies to corporate cases 
only. Citing Schoon, the Bax court asserted that “[o]ur precedent  
shows . . . that the common law equity power to extend derivative stand-
ing to address new circumstances is . . . limited to the corporate 
context.”163 But this limitation on equity jurisdiction is both novel and 
peculiar to Bax; it is not borne from Schoon to which the Bax court cited. 
To be sure, Schoon was decided in the corporate setting. But nothing in 
Schoon—or any other precedent—suggests that equity’s ability to ex-
tend itself onto new circumstances and relations as justice dictates is 
limited to only the corporate context.164 Indeed, the high court’s exten-
sion of equity jurisdiction in Severns to cover the removal of life 
support—a remedy “novel to Delaware and, relatively speaking, . . . new 
in our civilization”165—belies the naïve notion that equity is so  
historically cabined. 
 More importantly, even if, as Bax asserts, past Delaware prece-
dents showed that equitable doctrines have been extended in only 
corporate cases, equity is not so strictly bound by past precedents. Rec-
ognizing equity’s inherently capacious nature, the high court in 
Severns flatly stated that “the absence of precedent is no bar to the 
award of appropriate relief’’ in equity.166 Schoon elaborated on this 
point, quoting at length from Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence:  
                                                                                                                                        
 160. See id. at 1339-40. 
 161. Id. at 1348. 
 162. Id. 
 163. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 164. For example, in Schoon the court says, speaking in the context of corporate deriva-
tive standing, that “equitable doctrine can be judicially extended to address new 
circumstances,” without ever suggesting that those “new circumstances” must involve a cor-
poration. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 204 (Del. 2008). 
 165. Severns, 421 A.2d at 1349. 
 166. Id. at 1348. To support this assertion, the Severns court quoted at length from 
American Jurisprudence, among other sources: “The absence of a precedent for the giving of 
[equitable] relief in a case where it is evident that under general principles of equity relief 
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The true function of precedents is that of illustrating principles; 
they are examples of the manner and extent to which principles 
have been applied; they are the landmarks by which the court de-
termines the course and direction in which principles have been 
carried. But with all this guiding, limiting, and restraining efficacy 
of prior decisions, the Chancellor always has had, and always must 
have, a certain power and freedom of action, not possessed by the 
courts of law, of adapting the doctrines which he administers. He 
can extend those doctrines to new relations, and shape his remedies 
to new circumstances, if the relations and circumstances come 
within the principles of equity . . . . 167 
Echoing these fundamental precepts, Chancellor Allen presciently ob-
served—just five years before the Delaware LLC statute was enacted—
that “[t]he nature of chancery’s particular mission forecloses the devel-
opment of fixed and limited categories of relationships over which 
equity will take jurisdiction . . . . We cannot predict all categories of 
relationships in which that power may properly be called intoaction.”168 
 In this regard, Bax’s attempt to confine equity to “fixed and limited 
categories of relationships”—namely corporations and other business 
forms in existence at the time of this nation’s independence—runs 
counter to the very nature of equity. It contradicts a basic maxim of 
                                                                                                                                        
should be granted is of no consequence and presents no obstacle to the exercise of the juris-
diction of an equity court.” Id. (quoting 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 121); accord Neal v. Ala. By-
Products Corp., 1988 WL 105754, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1988) (Berger, V.C.) (“[L]ack of 
precedent is not a bar to the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers.”). 
 167. Schoon, 953 A.2d at 204-05 (quoting POMEROY, supra note 1, § 60, at 77-78) (em-
phasis added). Elsewhere, Professor Pomeroy explained in his widely-cited treatise: 
[T]he already settled principles of equity jurisprudence. . . . may unquestionably 
be extended to new facts and circumstances as they arise, which are analogous 
to facts and circumstances that have already been the subject-matter of judicial 
decision . . . .  
  All who are conversant with the history of equity jurisprudence know that . . . it 
has been of constant growth and development from its inception . . . . The jurisdic-
tion of a court of equity does not depend upon the mere accident whether the court 
has, in some previous case or at some distant period of time, granted relief under 
similar circumstances, but rather upon the necessities of mankind . . .  
POMEROY, supra note 1, § 47, at 62, § 67, at 89-90 (emphasis added); In addition to Pomeroy’s 
Equity Jurisprudence, the Schoon court also cites McClintock on Equity, supra note  
11, § 4, at 10, for the proposition that “the chancellors could adapt their system to meet 
changing needs without resorting to the fiction that they were merely interpreting and ap-
plying former rules, but the tendency to follow the path laid out by former chancellors was 
strong.” Schoon, 953 A.2d at 205 n.24. 
 168. McMahon v. New Castle Assoc., 532 A.2d 601, 605 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
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equity: that equity regards substance rather than form.169 LLCs repre-
sent precisely the type of analogous “new relations” to which Professor 
Pomeroy alluded.170 Yet, by excluding LLCs from the domain of equity 
based solely upon the historical date the LLC form came into existence, 
Bax ironically smacks of the very rigidity and technical formalism to 
which equity originally arose as an ameliorative.  
B.   Subsequent Changes Undermining Bax 
 By starting with a flawed premise, Bax reaches a flawed conclusion. 
This alone would be reason enough to believe that future cases will 
disavow, disregard, or distinguish Bax and instead embrace Carlisle’s 
characterization of equity jurisdiction as applied to LLCs. But events 
since the time Bax was decided only reaffirm this prediction. Since 
Bax, changes in both Delaware’s LLC statute and its state bench sug-
gest the ‘purely contractarian’ view of LLCs, upon which Bax was 
based, no longer has purchase.  
1.   Changes in the LLC Statute  
 At the time Bax was decided, there was an ongoing debate among 
members of the bar, bench, and academy about the role of equity in 
LLCs.171 Some advocated for a “purely contractarian” view of the 
                                                                                                                                        
 169. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 378, at 40-41 (“[E]quity regards substance rather than 
form . . . . Equity always attempts to get at the substance of things, and to ascertain, uphold, 
and enforce rights and duties which spring from the real relations of parties.”). 
 170. Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 n.73 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) 
(Parsons, V.C.) (“Manger-managed LLCs are, in many ways, analogous to corporations, 
whereas member-managed LLCs may be more analogous to a partnership.”); cf. Auriga Cap-
ital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.) (“The manager 
of an LLC—which is in plain words a limited liability “company” having many of the features 
of a corporation—easily fits the definition of a fiduciary.” (emphasis added)). 
 171. The debate divided into three camps. Anti-contractarians believe that the equitable 
principle of fiduciary duty should not be subject to contractual limitations or waivers. See, 
e.g., Callison & Vestal, supra note 5; Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty 
into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451 (2006); Kleinberger, supra note 2; Sandra K. Miller, The 
Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual Freedom in Alternative Busi-
ness Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 315-24 (2014); Sandra K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the 
LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Par-
ties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243, 254-60 (2009); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in 
Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic 
and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2004). Traditional contractarians 
believe that the equitable principle of fiduciary duty should be the default rule, but subject 
to contractual limitations or waivers. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 249 (“[A]s in limited partnerships and corporations, managers of 
manager-managed LLCs should have default fiduciary duties.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduci-
ary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927, 965 (2004) 
(“Fiduciary duties in business associations should be regarded as default rules that work 
together with, and can be displaced by, explicit provisions of the contract.”); Larry E. Rib-
stein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 147 
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LLC.172 Under the “purely contractarian” view, an LLC agreement is 
like any other contract.173 As a contract, the relationship of the mem-
bers and managers involved in an LLC is defined by the terms of their 
LLC agreement, rather than by any judicially imposed rights and ob-
ligations.174 Put differently, as a purely contractual entity, LLCs do not 
operate against the same background of equity, including fiduciary du-
ties, that courts have traditionally applied to corporations and 
partnerships.175 In support of the purely contractarian view, adherents 
pointed to Delaware’s strong legislative policy favoring the freedom of 
contract for LLCs,176 arguing that this statutory language confirms 
LLCs are defined solely by contract and not by equitably implied rights 
                                                                                                                                        
(arguing, in the limited partnership context, that “only where that [governing] document is 
silent or ambiguous” should a court “look for guidance from the statutory default rules [or] 
traditional notions of fiduciary duties”). Finally, pure contractarians believe that the LLC is 
a purely contractual relationship to which the equitable principle of fiduciary duty is inap-
plicable even as default rule. See, e.g., Fisk Ventures LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 
1961156, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (Chandler, C.) aff’d 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) 
(“[A]ffirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery.” (empha-
sis added)); Ann E. Conaway & Peter I. Tsoflias, Challenging Traditional Thought: No 
Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Liability Companies After Auriga, 13 J. BUS. 
& SEC. L. 1 (2012); Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in 
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221 
(2009); Nicole M. Sciotto, Note, Opt-In vs. Opt-Out: Settling the Debate over Default Fiduci-
ary Duties in Delaware LLCs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 531 (2012).  
 172. Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1 (Chandler, C.) (“Contractual language de-
fines the scope, structure, and personality of [LLCs].”); Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, 
at 6 (“ ‘[F]reedom of contract’ signifies to a reviewing court that a Delaware LLC is a bar-
gained-for, contractual entity . . . . ”); Sciotto, supra note 171, at 555 (“LLCs are ‘creatures of 
contract’ whose relationships must be governed solely by the LLC agreement’s terms . . . .”); 
Steele, supra note 171, at 242 (arguing that “courts should analyze LLC agreements by the 
parties’ agreement alone” without reference to default equitable principles).  
 173. Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Chandler, C.) (“In the context of [LLCs], 
which are creatures not of the state but of contract, [those] duties or obligations [of the par-
ties] must be found in the LLC Agreement or some other contract.” (footnote omitted)); 
Steele, supra note 171, at 235 (asserting that with respect to the interpretation of LLC agree-
ments “my answer is simple: treat it like a contract”). 
 174. See supra note 172. 
 175. See Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 11-12 (arguing that LLCs, unlike cor-
porations, general partnerships and limited partnerships, do not warrant judicially imposed 
fiduciary duties); Sciotto, supra note 171, at 561 (same). 
 176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016). 
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or obligations.177 This statutory language, adherents argued, even dis-
placed the “rules of law and equity” that the LLC statute provides 
would otherwise apply in LLC cases.178 
 The purely contractarian view of LLCs appears to have animated 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Bax. In rejecting the notion 
that the chancery court’s constitutionally vested equity jurisdiction ex-
tends to LLCs, the high court reasoned that LLCs do not operate 
against the background of equity that applies to corporations.179 This 
reasoning makes sense if LLCs, unlike corporations, represent a 
purely contractual relationship. 
 In this regard, Bax laid the foundation for the high court’s more 
notorious ruling in Gatz Properties v. Auriga Capital,180 decided just 
fourteen months later. Recall in Gatz, then-Chancellor Strine held in 
the chancery court that individuals vested with discretionary power to 
manage the business of an LLC owe a fiduciary duty to the LLC and 
its members unless those duties are modified or waived by the terms 
of the LLC agreement.181 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court cast 
doubt on this seemingly uncontroversial holding.182 Calling into ques-
tion a long line of chancery court precedents,183 the high court 
suggested that fiduciary duties are not just subordinate to the freedom 
of contract, but wholly inapplicable to LLCs.184 Although the high 
court’s ruling in Gatz surprised many academics, practitioners, and 
                                                                                                                                        
 177. See, e.g., R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 
2008 WL 3846318, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (citing the statutorily prescribed “freedom 
of contract” to assert that LLCs are “creatures of contract” (internal citations omitted)); Con-
away & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 4 (citing the statutorily prescribed “freedom of contract” 
to assert that LLCs are “contractual in nature; and [therefore,] [] contractual principles were 
to be given dominance above tort-based, fiduciary principles”); Steele, supra note 171, at 234 
(“[The] general principle of freedom of contract annunciated by the legislature indicates that 
courts should not assume that default fiduciary duties apply.”). 
 178. See Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 27 (arguing that the Delaware LLC 
statute’s express policy of freedom of contract “fill[s] the void” in which the rules of “law and 
equity” provision might otherwise apply); Sciotto, supra note 171, at 556 (“T]he unambiguous 
legislative intent to ‘give [sic] the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract’ 
read in tandem with the statutory authorization permitting the elimination or modification 
of fiduciary duties, ostensibly displaces any reliance upon the catch-all ‘law and equity’ pro-
vision . . . .” (quoting Auriga, 40 A.3d 839, 849-52 (Del. 2012)). 
 179. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. 
 180. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). See generally Manesh, 
Damning Dictum, supra note 144 (criticizing the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Gatz). 
 181. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Gatz, 59 A.3d at 1218-19.   
 183. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Gatz, 59 A.3d at 1218-19 (asserting that “reasonable minds could differ” on the 
question of whether fiduciary duties apply to LLCs, even in the absence of an agreement 
limiting or eliminating such duties); see also Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 
48 (“[T]he supreme court [in Gatz] made clear that going forward, contract drafters and par-
ties to LLC agreements could no longer take default fiduciary duties for granted.”). 
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jurists,185 it was entirely consistent with Bax’s purely contractarian 
view of LLCs.186 After all, under the purely contractarian view, the re-
lationship among members and managers in a LLC is contractual. And 
the only judicially implied duty owed by contract parties is the implied 
covenant of good faith and dealing.187 Contract parties are not fiduci-
aries of one another.188  
  The purely contractarian view of LLCs has always been flawed. 
LLCs, like other business entities, provide parties with legal benefits 
that simply cannot be contracted for by individuals through private 
agreement.189 As Vice Chancellor Laster concisely observed in Carlisle,  
[T]he purely contractarian view discounts core attributes of the LLC 
that only the sovereign can authorize, such as its separate legal ex-
istence, potentially perpetual life, and limited liability for its 
members. . . . [W]hen a sovereign makes available an entity with 
attributes that contracting parties cannot grant themselves by 
agreement, the entity is not purely contractual. . . .   
. . . .  
. . . Put more directly, an LLC agreement is not an exclusively pri-
vate contract among its members precisely because the LLC has 
powers that only the State of Delaware can confer.190 
For this reason, it has never been quite correct to suggest that LLCs 
are merely “creatures of contract,” as courts sometimes do.191 Although 
                                                                                                                                        
 185. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 48. 
 186. Indeed, in assessing Bax, one noted attorney presciently predicted that Bax’s “treat-
ment of . . . equit[y] jurisdiction . . . may be most interesting over time. . . . [O]ne might watch 
for a contractarian expansion of the originalist position [espoused in Bax] in the case of LLC 
fiduciary duties.” Bill Callison, Thoughts on Creditor Fiduciary Duties After CML V v. Bax, 
CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/09/thoughts-
on-creditor-fiduciary-duties-after-cml-v-v-bax.html [https://perma.cc/62MH-HSR4]. 
 187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement.”); Mohsen Manesh, Express Terms and the Implied Contractual Covenant of 
Delaware Law, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2013) [hereinafter Manesh, Express Terms](“Like 
the law of other states, the Implied Covenant is an unwaivable obligation implied into every 
contract under Delaware law.”); Steele, supra note 171, at 234 (“Under Delaware contract 
jurisprudence, Delaware courts have limited their application of default duties to the implied 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
 188. See Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 2, 4-5 (endorsing the purely contractar-
ian view and asserting that “fiduciary duties are unnecessary in the LLC business form” 
because “[c]ontract law does not impose fiduciary duties between parties”). 
 189. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 605-06 (Del. Ch. 2015) (noting flaws 
in the “purely contractarian” view of LLCs); Johnson, supra note 22, at 721 (“[A]ll . . . busi-
ness statutes . . . confer state-ordained benefits—limited liability being the obvious example 
that participants themselves do not and cannot create by contract inter se.”). 
 190. Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 605-06 (citation omitted). 
 191. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 
2010) (Parsons, V.C.) (“LLCs are creatures of contract . . . .”); R & R Capital, LLC v.  
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LLCs are primarily “creatures of contract,” they are also inescapably 
creatures of the state, just like other statutory business forms.192  
 Whatever the merits of the purely contractarian view of LLCs, it 
has now been soundly rejected by the Delaware General Assembly.193 
In 2013, the Delaware legislature amended the LLC statute to provide 
that “[i]n any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and 
equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary  
duties . . . shall govern.”194 This amendment was passed as a direct 
response to the high court’s Gatz decision.195 In amending the LLC 
statute, the Delaware General Assembly confirmed that LLCs are not 
purely contractual entities, but instead are a form of business associa-
tion that operates against the same background “of law and equity, 
including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties” that 
applies to other business forms.196   
                                                                                                                                        
Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
19, 2008) (Chandler, C.) (“[LLCs] are creatures of contract, ‘designed to afford the maximum 
amount of freedom of contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved.’ ” 
(quoting Travel Ctrs. of Am., LLC, v. Brog, C.A., No. 3516-CC, 2008 WL 1746987, at *1 
(Del.Ch. Apr.3, 2008))); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 
(Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (Chandler, C.) (“In the context of [LLCs], which are creatures not of 
the state but of contract, [any] duties or obligations must be found in the LLC  
[a]greement . . . .”); accord In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, 
at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (Noble, V.C.). 
 192. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 721 (“Of course, like many close business arrange-
ments, . . . [LLCs] are creatures of both statute and contract.”); accord REVISED UNIFORM 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 110 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) (“A [LLC] is as much 
a creature of contract as of statute.”); Obeid v. Hogan, No. 11900–VCL, 2016 WL 3356851, 
at *5, n.2 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016) (Laster, V.C.) (“It is frequently observed that LLCs ‘are 
creatures of contract,’ which they primarily are. . . . The adverb ‘primarily’ recognizes the 
critical but sometimes overlooked non-contractual dimensions of the entity.”); Brog, No. 
3751-CC, 2008 WL 5272861, at *2 (“[LLCs] are primarily creatures of contract.” (emphasis 
added)). Even former Chief Justice Myron Steele, a leading advocate of the purely contrac-
tarian view, is forced to concede the inexorable role of the state in LLCs when he 
acknowledges that LLCs exist due to state statutes. See, e.g., CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 
1037, 1045 (Del. 2011) (Steele, C.J.) (“[W]hen adjudicating the rights, remedies, and obliga-
tions associated with Delaware LLCs, courts must look to the LLC Act because it is only the 
statute that creates those rights, remedies, and obligations.”); Myron T. Steele, Judicial 
Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Com-
panies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Steele, Judicial Scrutiny] (“[L]imited 
partnerships and [LLCs], like corporations, are creatures of statute . . . .”). 
 193. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 605 (“[T]he General Assembly in 2013 adopted an amendment 
to the LLC Act inconsistent with the purely contractarian view.”); Jowers & Adams, supra note 
122, at 1 (“Both the case law [citing Carlisle] and an amendment to the Delaware [LLC statute] 
in recent years demonstrate Delaware’s rejection of a solely contractarian view of LLCs.”). 
 194. H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013). 
 195. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 67-68. 
 196. See Jowers & Adams, supra note 122, at 3 (“The debate regarding whether a Dela-
ware LLC should be viewed as a purely contractual entity to which principles of equity 
(including fiduciary duties) do not apply was resolved in 2013 when the Delaware General 
Assembly adopted [the] amendment to [the state’s LLC statute].”). 
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 The legislature’s rejection of Gatz also has clear implications for 
Bax. By confirming that traditional equitable principles apply to 
LLCs, the 2013 amendment repudiates Bax’s central conclusion. With 
this central tenant of Bax now undermined by the state’s legislature, 
Delaware jurists may not feel bound to follow Bax in future cases de-
spite principles of stare decisis. Indeed, this consideration, in part, is 
what motivated Vice Chancellor Laster to depart from Bax in Car-
lisle.197 After all, if traditional equitable principles apply to LLCs, 
as the Delaware statute now explicitly makes clear,198 then the 
chancery court’s jurisdiction to apply and enforce those principles is  
constitutionally protected.199  
2.   Changes Among the Delaware Judiciary 
 Aside from the recent change to the Delaware LLC statute, there is 
another reason to question Bax’s continued viability as binding prece-
dent. Since Bax was decided, the leading advocate of the purely 
contractarian view of LLCs has left the Delaware Supreme Court and 
been replaced by a jurist with a decidedly different perspective.  
 Writing academically, in an extrajudicial capacity, the former Chief 
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Myron Steele, was a forceful 
proponent of the purely contractarian view of LLCs.200 Later, the chief 
justice would author the Bax decision and also likely had a strong in-
fluence in Gatz, an unsigned per curiam opinion.201 As noted above, 
both decisions are grounded in the purely contractarian perspective.202 
                                                                                                                                        
 197. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 605 (“[T]he General Assembly in 2013 adopted an amend-
ment to the LLC Act inconsistent with the purely contractarian view.”). 
 198. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (2016). 
 199. Although the statutory language suggests that equitable principles are merely a 
gap-filler in the LLC context, applicable only where the statute or relevant LLC agreement 
does not address a particular matter, the statute nonetheless reflects the legislature’s con-
cession that traditional equitable principles do in fact apply to LLCs. This concession is 
important, because if traditional equitable principles do apply to LLCs, then the chancery 
court’s jurisdiction to recognize and apply those principles is constitutionally protected.  
 200. See generally Steele, supra note 171 (espousing the purely contractarian view); see also 
Q&A with Chief Justice Myron T. Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court, PRAC. L.J. (Dec. 1, 
2012), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-515-1049 [http://perma.cc/B4J7-95P3] (“Those who advocate 
for default fiduciary duties . . . . miss the fact that the LLC . . . statute’s explicit policy is to max-
imize contractual freedom. The way to maximize contractual freedom is to look at . . . the contract. 
. . . [LLC parties’] entire relationship is driven by the terms of the contract.”).  
 201. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 62-64 (arguing that the unanim-
ity norm at the Delaware Supreme Court coupled with Chief Justice Steele’s idiosyncratic, 
purely contractarian view of LLCs, resulted in the per curium opinion in Gatz); D. Gordon 
Smith, Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1783, 1791 (observing 
that the Gatz opinion “bears the fingerprints of . . . Chief Justice . . . Steele”). 
 202. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text. 
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 Since Bax and Gatz, Chief Justice Steele has retired from the 
bench.203 He was succeeded by Leo Strine, formerly the Chancellor of 
the Delaware Chancery Court and before that a Vice Chancellor.204 
There is, of course, a delicious coincidence in this choice of replace-
ment. Then-Chancellor Strine was the author of the chancery court 
Gatz opinion that the supreme court repudiated on appeal.205  
 A cursory review of then-Chancellor Strine’s chancery court opinion 
in Gatz makes clear that he disagrees with the purely contractarian 
premise that traditional equitable principles are inapplicable to LLCs. 
In Gatz, the then-chancellor variously described LLCs as subject to an 
“equity backdrop,” “equitable background,” and “equity overlay.”206 
And applying “traditional and settled principles of equity,” he con-
cluded that “[m]anagers of LLCs easily qualify as fiduciaries.”207 
 To be sure, like other Delaware jurists, Chief Justice Strine has in 
the past recognized and deferred to the freedom of contract mandated 
by the LLC statute.208 But the chief justice has yet to express an opin-
ion on how this statutorily mandated freedom of contract interacts 
with the chancery court’s constitutionally vested equitable powers. 
Having acknowledged that traditional principles of equity apply to 
LLCs, it follows that the chancery court’s jurisdiction to recognize and 
apply those principles is constitutionally protected. And because that 
jurisdiction is constitutionally protected, the chancery court’s equita-
ble powers cannot be abridged by legislation or private agreement.    
 Finally, lest one might overly focus on the views of one chief justice, 
it bears noting that he is only one of five members of the Delaware 
Supreme Court. Like the now-retired chief justice, the four other mem-
bers of the Bax Court also no longer serve as justices on the high 
                                                                                                                                        
 203. See Chief Justice Steele Retiring, THE NEWS J., Sep. 7, 2013. 
 204. See Strine Officially Sworn in, THE NEWS J., Mar. 1, 2014. 
 205. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 851, 853, 854 (Del. Ch. 
2012) (Strine, C.). 
 207. Id. at 854 (emphasis added); accord id. at 856 n.65 (“[M]anagers of LLCs owe fidu-
ciary duties because they fit within the classic definition of a fiduciary of a business 
enterprise under traditional principles of equity.”).  
 208. See, e.g., id. at 852 (Strine, C.) (“Where the parties [to an LLC agreement] have 
clearly supplanted default principles [of fiduciary duty] in full, we give effect to the parties’ 
contract choice.”); Related Westpac LLC v. Jer Snowmass LLC, No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL 
2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (Strine, V.C.) (“When . . . [parties] cover a particular 
subject in an express manner, their contractual choice governs and cannot be supplanted by 
the application of inconsistent fiduciary duty principles that might otherwise apply as a de-
fault.”); R.S.M. Inc. v. All. Capital Mgmt. Holdings L.P., 790 A.2d 478, 497 (Del. Ch. 2001) 
(Strine, V.C.) (observing in the limited partnership context that “where the use of default 
fiduciary duties would intrude upon . . . contractual rights . . . or be insensible in view of the 
contractual mechanisms governing the transaction under consideration, the court will es-
chew fiduciary concepts and focus on a purely contractual analysis of the dispute”). 
128  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:93 
   
court.209 None of the state supreme court’s new appointees have yet 
expressed an opinion on the constitutional question.210 But given Chief 
Justice Strine’s outsized role in the development of Delaware corporate 
and alternative entity law as well as the unanimity norm among  
the Delaware justices,211 it is likely his views will be influential on his  
new colleagues. 
V.   PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES  
 Based on the foregoing discussion, Bax’s precedential value is at 
best dubious. Still, even if Carlisle portends the demise of Bax and 
a reinvigorated role for equity, the overt consequences will be mod-
est in practice. Equity is unlikely to upend the hundreds of 
thousands of agreements governing Delaware LLCs today. As Sec-
tion A explains, both policy and pragmatic considerations suggest 
the Delaware Chancery Court will be judiciously sparing in the use 
of its constitutionally vested equitable powers. Given the central im-
portance of certainty and predictability in business relations, the 
court is unlikely to subvert the express terms of an LLC agreement 
in order “to do right and justice” in all but the most exceptional 
cases. One exceptional circumstance, Section B suggests, may be 
that of involving publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships, 
where the courts have otherwise struggled to obtain just results in 
the face of prolix, unread, and unnegotiated agreements that author-
ize bad faith or self-dealing. But even in this narrow context, the 
judicial use of equitable power will be tempered by the availability 
of adequate legal remedies and market-based considerations that 
weigh against the exercise of equitable discretion.  
 Consequently, the practical role of equity in LLCs will be more 
subtle than overt. Because even if the Delaware courts seldom as-
sert their equitable jurisdiction, the very existence of an 
unwaivable judicial power “to do right and justice” may chasten 
parties against brazen overreach in the drafting of LLC agreements 
                                                                                                                                        
 209. Bax was a unanimous opinion of Justices Steele, Holland, Berger, and Ridgely 
(along with Judge Bradley, a lower court judge who participated in the Bax case ad hoc pur-
suant to the high court’s internal procedures). Since Bax, Justices Steele, Berger, Ridgely, 
and Holland have all retired from the Delaware Supreme Court. See CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 
A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011); David Marcus, Ridgely Becomes Fourth in String of Delaware Justices 
to Step Down, THE DEAL, Nov. 10, 2014; David Marcus, Holland to Retire from Delaware 
Supreme Court, THE DEAL, Feb. 19, 2017. 
 210. But see Trusa v. Nepo, No. CV 12071-VCMR, 2017 WL 1379594, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
13, 2017) (Montgomery-Reeves, V.C.) (citing Carlisle to recognize the power of the chancery 
court to order equitable dissolution of an LLC). 
 211. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate 
Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127 (1997) (describing and providing evidence of the unanimity norm 
among the justices of the Delaware Supreme Court).  
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or exploitation in performance thereunder.212 Put differently, free-
dom of contract will subsist, but it will be exercised always in the 
shadow of the courts’ equitable power.213 
A.   Constraints on Unbridled Equity  
 To say that the Delaware state constitution precludes any state 
statute or LLC agreement from divesting the chancery court of its 
equitable powers, as Carlisle did, does not mean that the terms of an 
LLC agreement that purport to limit fiduciary duties or other equi-
table rights or obligations are per se invalid.214 Rather, it simply 
means that the chancery court need not unquestioningly defer to the 
language of an LLC agreement in every conceivable circumstance—
especially in light of conduct that is manifestly opportunistic, exploi-
tative, or otherwise inequitable.215  
 Judicial disregard of express contract terms in the face of inequita-
ble circumstances is not novel to LLC law. Consider Haley v. Talcott,216 
a case decided by Chief Justice Strine, then a vice chancellor, a decade 
before Carlisle. In Haley, the then-vice chancellor ordered the dissolu-
tion of an LLC on equitable grounds despite the fact that the governing 
LLC agreement included a “detailed exit provision” for the petitioning 
member to withdraw from the business without the LLC’s dissolu-
tion.217 Acknowledging that the “contract-law foundations” of LLC law, 
“grounded on principles of freedom of contract[,] . . . bear[] on the pro-
priety of ordering dissolution,”218 the vice chancellor nonetheless 
ordered dissolution, explaining that the “exit mechanism [set forth in 
the LLC agreement] fails as an adequate remedy . . . because it does 
                                                                                                                                        
 212. Cf. Mohsen Manesh, Indeterminacy and Self-Enforcement: A Defense of Delaware’s 
Approach to Director Independence in Derivative Litigation, 6 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 177, 197 
(2006) (arguing that Delaware law’s indeterminate standards for director independence en-
courage boards to self-police to avoid judicial scrutiny of suspect director relationships). 
 213. Cf. Lyman Johnson, Enduring Equity in the Close Corporation, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 313, 330-36 (2011) (describing the vital role of equity in corporate law and the enduring 
“uneasy tension” between law and equity); Mark J. Loewenstein, Equity and Corporate Law, 
68 SMU L. REV. 783, 789-92 (2015) (arguing that equity introduces uncertainty and under-
mines private ordering in corporate law).  
 214. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 718-19. 
 215. See id.; id at 721 (arguing that it, in light of the chancery court’s constitutionally 
vested equity power, the proper construction of the LLC statute is to permit fiduciary waiv-
ers, but not in every conceivable instance). 
 216. Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 217. Id. at 97-98. 
 218. Id. at 93, 96. 
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not equitably effect the separation of the parties” given the specific 
circumstances of that case.219  
 Admittedly, in asserting equity over the “detailed” terms of the LLC 
agreement, Haley did not explicitly rely on the chancery court’s consti-
tutionally protected equitable jurisdiction. Carlisle, however, 
furnishes the constitutional basis for Haley. Even though Carlisle ad-
dressed a statutory provision, rather than an LLC agreement, Vice 
Chancellor Laster made clear in dicta that, as a constitutional matter, 
the chancery court retains the equitable discretion to disregard the ex-
press terms of an LLC agreement where equity demands it.220 
 In exercising this equitable discretion, a court might consider a va-
riety of factors221: the sophistication of the parties to the LLC 
agreement; whether that agreement was negotiated, a form agree-
ment,222 or unilaterally drafted and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis; how specifically the contractual language in that agreement con-
dones the challenged conduct or otherwise addresses the 
circumstances at issue;223 the moral or commercial repugnance of the 
                                                                                                                                        
 219. Id. at 98. Although the petitioning member seeking judicial dissolution could have 
exercised his rights under the LLC agreement to withdraw from the LLC and receive fair 
market value for his share of the business, his withdrawal would not relieve him of his obli-
gation as a personal guarantor of a mortgage on the LLC’s assets. Id. at 88. Consequently, 
the petitioning member “would still be left holding the bag on the guaranty. It is therefore 
not equitable to force [him] to use the exit mechanism [set forth in the LLC agreement] in 
this circumstance,” the court ruled. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted). 
 220. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 605 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“This court has 
held that the parties to an LLC agreement can waive by contract the right to seek statutory 
dissolution . . . . In my view, the ability to waive [statutory] dissolution . . . does not extend to 
a party’s standing to seek dissolution in equity.” (citations omitted)); cf. Huatuco v. Satellite 
Healthcare & Satellite Dialysis of Tracy, LLC, No. 8465–VCG, 2013 WL 6460898, at *1 n.2 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2013) (questioning “[w]hether [LLC] parties may, by contract, divest this 
Court of its authority to order a dissolution in all circumstances, even where it appears man-
ifest that equity so requires . . . .”), aff’d, 93 A.3d 654 (Del. 2014) (unpublished table decision); 
Jowers & Adams, supra note 122, at 1 (“Based on Carlisle, the Court of Chancery may use its 
equitable powers to dissolve a Delaware LLC even where neither the operating agreement 
nor the LLC Act expressly permits such dissolution.”). But see R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & 
Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) 
(holding that an LLC agreement may eliminate the right to judicial dissolution).  
 221. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 719 (describing a similar set of factors relevant to 
the exercise of equitable discretion). 
 222. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 594, 606-07 (exercising equitable discretion to order disso-
lution where the parties used a “simple form” LLC agreement that did not accurately reflect 
the LLC parties’ intended bargain). 
 223. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
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challenged conduct or circumstances; as well as whether available le-
gal remedies would be adequate.224 How these factors weigh in any 
given case is necessarily context specific.225 
 But one factor that must be weighed in every case is the central 
importance of certainty and determinacy in business relationships 
generally226 and LLCs in particular.227 To the extent the courts exer-
cise their constitutionally protected equitable power to override the 
express terms of a particular LLC agreement, the courts undercut the 
ability of all parties to rely on such agreements. Such uncertainty com-
plicates business planning and promotes costly litigation.228 It risks 
undermining parties’ bargained-for risk allocation and the contractual 
and extra-contractual mechanisms upon which that allocation was 
based.229 Put differently, even putting aside Delaware’s statutory man-
date, the freedom of contract and the enforceability of bargained-for 
                                                                                                                                        
 224. See, e.g., Huatuco, 2013 WL 6460898, at *6 (denying petition for judicial dissolution 
where the plaintiff may have an adequate legal remedy in a suit for breach of contract); see 
also infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 719 (“This [equitable] analysis will, as always, re-
quire the weighing of several factors and, ultimately, demands the exercise of judgment [by 
the court] . . . .”). 
 226. See e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 721 (“A stronger case for [fiduciary] waivers 
would focus on the desirability of greater certainty and determinacy in intra-firm  
relations . . . .”); Id. at 719 (arguing that courts must exercise equitable discretion “with mind-
fulness being given not only to the interest of the parties before the court but also to the 
ramifications for business dealings more generally”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 
514 (“[C]orporate law’s main goals ought to be certainty and predictability. Uncertainty about 
the contours and content of a legal rule imposes substantial costs.” (footnote omitted)); Ehud 
Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. 
R. 1908, 1919 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of determinacy in corporate law). 
 227. See R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 
WL 3846318, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (Chandler, C.) (“The allure of the [LLC], however, 
would be eviscerated if the parties could simply petition this court to renegotiate their agree-
ments when relationships sour.”); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 88 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, 
V.C.) (“A principle attraction of the LLC form of entity is the statutory freedom granted to 
members to shape, by contract, their own approach to common business ‘relationship’ prob-
lems.”); Manesh, Market for LLC Law, supra note 2, 226-34 (arguing that a principal 
advantage of LLC law is that freedom of contract enables LLCs to avoid the costs and uncer-
tainty associated with indeterminate principles of fiduciary duty); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 78 (criticizing the doctrine of LLC veil 
piercing for creating “only uncertainty and lack of predictability, thus increasing transaction 
costs for small businesses”).  
 228. See Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 53, at 503; cf. Steele, supra note 171, at 
241 (arguing that the judicial imposition of fiduciary duties in LLCs increases litigation costs). 
 229. See Suren Gomstian, Contractual Mechanisms of Investor Protection in Non-Listed 
Limited Liability Companies, 60 VILL. L. REV. 955, 957 (2015) (providing evidence that par-
ticipants in privately held LLCs utilize contractual substitutes in lieu of statutory default 
rules, such as fiduciary duties, to ensure equivalent protection of investors); John Goodgame, 
Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471, 474-79 (2005) (identifying vari-
ous contractual “obligations and incentives likely [to] promote proper management” of a 
publicly traded limited partnership); Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 597 
n.229 (acknowledging that beyond the express terms of the governing agreement “capital, 
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agreements are intrinsically important values that must be considered 
in any equitable analysis.  
 Delaware courts have routinely cited the vital importance of cer-
tainty and determinacy in express contractual obligations when 
rejecting claims based on the implied contractual covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing230—a contract law doctrine that affords courts 
room to exercise equitable discretion231 and, like the courts’ equity ju-
risdiction, cannot be waived by the terms of an LLC agreement.232 For 
                                                                                                                                        
product, and labor markets (although not the market for control) may play an important role 
in incentivizing and holding alternative entity managers accountable”); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 290-98 (2009) [hereinafter 
Ribstein, Partnership Governance] (identifying various contractual and extra-contractual 
mechanisms that provide managerial accountability in large unincorporated firms in lieu of 
fiduciary duties); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 546-47 (1997) (same). But see Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners 
Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 503 (2017) (finding “little 
evidence . . . that the contractual freedom is used to craft systematically more efficient contrac-
tual owner protections,” but instead that “LLCs with more vulnerable owners adopt 
significantly fewer owner safeguards, suggesting that contractual freedom may be used more 
often for opportunism and not for efficiency”). 
 230. See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 2010) (“[W]e must . . . not rewrite 
the contract to appease a party who later wishes to rewrite a contract he now believes to 
have been a bad deal.”); id. at 1128 (“Crafting . . . a post contracting equitable amendment 
that shifts economic benefits from [one contracting party to the other] would vitiate the lim-
ited reach of the [implied covenant].”); Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 
441 (Del. 2005) (“Existing contract terms control . . . such that implied good faith cannot be 
used to circumvent the parties’ bargain . . . .”); ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion 
Breckenridge Manager Member, LLC, No. 5843–VCL, 2012 WL 1869416, at *19 (Del. Ch. 
May 16, 2012) (Laster, V.C.) (“The [implied covenant] should not be used to ‘rewrite the con-
tract’ that a party now regards as ‘a bad deal.’ ” (quoting Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1126)); Winshall 
v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 55 A.3d 629, 637 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2011) (Strine, C.) (“[T]he implied 
covenant is not a license to rewrite contractual language just because the plaintiff failed to 
negotiate for [better] protections . . . .”); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1025 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (Laster, V.C.) (“[B]ecause the LP Act specifically authorizes the elimination 
of fiduciary duties, this Court must act with ‘caution and restraint’ and decline to use the 
implied covenant as a basis for ‘ignoring the clear language’ of Section 1101(d) and the Hold-
ings LP Agreement.” (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 87 (Del. 1992))); Related Westpac 
LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) 
(Strine, V.C.) (“[Plaintiff] seeks for me to imply a condition . . . that was expressly excluded 
by the terms of the contract! Delaware Law respects the freedom of parties in commerce to 
strike bargains . . . and enforces those bargains as plainly written.”); Frontier Oil Corp. v. 
Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *28 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (Noble, 
V.C.) (“The Court, of course, may not substitute its notions of fairness for the terms of the 
agreement reached by the parties.”); see also Klig v. Deloitte LLP, 36 A.3d 785, 797 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (Laster, V.C.) (“[The implied covenant] does not empower the Court to impose on the 
parties its own view of what would be fair or reasonable.”); cf. Strine & Laster, supra note 
233, at 26 (“[T]he potential expansion in the role of the implied covenant could render con-
tractual expectations less predictable, thereby raising the cost of contracting and deterring 
the formation of some relationships.”). 
 231. See Manesh, Express Terms, supra note 187, 32-38 (describing the equitable discre-
tion involved in applying the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
 232. See id. at 3; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2016) (prohibiting waiver 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in LLC agreements); id. § 17-1101(d) 
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the same reasons, Delaware courts are right to be exceedingly wary to 
deploy their constitutionally protected equitable powers to override 
the express terms of an LLC agreement. Consequently, the judicial use 
of that power may be limited to cases where the circumstances pre-
sented, although perhaps contemplated in general terms, are not 
specifically and explicitly addressed by the LLC agreement, and there-
fore, the express contractual right or obligation at issue is itself not 
fully determinate.233 
                                                                                                                                        
(prohibiting waiver of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in limited partner-
ship agreements); id. § 15-103(f) (prohibiting waiver of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in general partnership agreements). 
 233. Both Haley and Carlisle fit this criterion. In Haley, although the LLC agreement 
provided for a detailed exit mechanism in the event a member desired to leave the business, 
the detailed provisions did not specifically address the unusual facts of the case, namely 
what should happen where the member wishing to exit is also a bound by a personal guar-
anty to a third party on behalf of the business. See Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 92 (Del. 
Ch. 2004). Likewise, in Carlisle, although the LLC statute did not grant standing to the LLC 
interest assignee to seek judicial dissolution, neither the statutory provision nor the simple 
form LLC agreement used by the parties specifically addressed the unusual facts of that 
case, namely what should happen where, due to the parties’ informality, neither the assignee 
nor assignor qualified as a member and were, therefore, left powerless in the business’s gov-
ernance contrary to the parties’ original expectations. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 
A.3d 592, 606 (Del. Ch. 2015).  
  Applying this criterion to limit equitable intervention to only those cases where the 
relevant statutory or contract provisions do not specifically and explicitly address the cir-
cumstances presented is consistent with the suggestion that equity acts a ‘gap-filler’ where 
the parties’ agreement is otherwise silent. See, e.g., Jowers & Adams, supra note 122, at 1, 
4. In this respect, to the extent the courts limit the exercise of their equitable powers to only 
cases where the relevant statutory or contract text is silent to the specific circumstances 
presented, the role of equity will be akin to the role of the implied contractual covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing which is likewise a judicial gap-filler. See Manesh, Express 
Terms, supra note 187, at 20-43. The difference will be that the courts can be more explicit 
about considerations of fairness and justice, and therefore more aggressive, when exercising 
their equitable powers. Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited 
Contractual Freedom in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE 
FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 25-27 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein 
eds., 2015) (expressing concern that in the face of fiduciary waivers courts may be tempted 
to bend the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing to achieve justice in 
particularly egregious cases). 
  In identifying gaps in an LLC agreement, courts are aided by two doctrines. The 
first is the doctrine of contra proferentem, interpreting ambiguous provisions of an LLC 
agreement against the drafting party, often the manager or controlling member of the LLC. 
Cf. Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners, L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del. 2013) (“If the contractual 
language at issue is ambiguous and if the limited partners did not negotiate for the agree-
ment’s terms, we apply the contra proferentem principle . . . .”); In re Nantucket Island 
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship Unitholders Litig., 810 A.2d 351, 361 (Del. Ch. 2002) (Strine, V.C.) (ap-
plying contra proferentem to interpret ambiguity in a limited partnership agreement 
“drafted almost exclusively by the[] founding general partners—or perhaps more accurately, 
by the lawyers for the[] founding general partners”). The second is the principle that any 
contractual waiver of fiduciary duties must be explicit and unambiguous. See, e.g., Feeley v. 
NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 664 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Laster, V.C.) (“Drafters of an LLC agree-
ment ‘must make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.’ ” 
(quoting Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 
134  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:93 
   
 Related to the importance of certainty in business law, there is a 
second, more pragmatic reason to believe the chancery court will exer-
cise its constitutional equity jurisdiction sparingly, in only the most 
exceptional, compelling cases. Delaware, as a state, draws enor-
mous—and growing—revenues due to its popularity as the legal home 
to hundreds of thousands of LLCs.234 And over the last decade, while 
the percentage of the state’s annual revenue derived from corporate 
franchise taxes has been flat, an increasingly larger portion of the 
state’s annual revenue has been derived from the taxes paid by LLCs 
organized in Delaware.235  
 Business planners and their attorneys nationally are drawn to Del-
aware’s LLC law principally because of the perceived certainty and 
contractual freedom it affords, including the freedom to modify or elim-
inate fiduciary duties.236 If the chancery court were to routinely use its 
constitutionally protected equitable power to override the express 
terms of LLC agreements in anything other than the most exceptional 
and compelling circumstances, then it would undermine this key at-
traction of the state and jeopardize Delaware’s lucrative LLC tax base.  
 Even if Delaware’s judges are insensitive to this fact, Delaware’s 
political actors will undoubtedly be more pragmatically minded.237 And 
while exercising equitable discretion is a judicial question, amending 
the state constitution to strip the courts of that discretion is a political 
question that can be decided on purely pragmatic considerations.238 
Mindful that their constitutional power to do equity will be jeopardized 
by the imprudent use of that power, Delaware jurists are likely to limit 
                                                                                                                                        
1124451, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (Strine, V.C.))); Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner 
Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502-C5, 2011 WL 3505355, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) (Strine, 
C.) (“Although Delaware’s [LP statute] permits the waiver of fiduciary duties, such waivers 
must be set forth clearly . . . .”); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 n.70 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (Parsons, V.C.) (“Having been granted great contractual freedom by 
the LLC Act, drafters of and parties to an LLC agreement should be expected to provide . . . 
clear and unambiguous provisions when they desire to expand, restrict, or eliminate the op-
eration of traditional fiduciary duties.”); Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319, 322 (Del. 
Ch. 1998) (Chandler, C.) (“[P]rinciples of contract preempt fiduciary principles where the 
parties to a limited partnership have made their intentions to do so plain.”). 
 234. See Manesh, Market for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 200-04.  
 235. See id. at 197-204. 
 236. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs?, 91 OR. L. REV. 57, 105 (2012) (re-
porting the results of interviews with business attorneys about their preference for Delaware 
LLC law); see also supra note 227. 
 237. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 67 (citing other examples of the 
Delaware legislature’s alacrity to promptly correct problematic judicial precedents). 
 238. The Delaware state constitution may be modified in one of two ways, both of which can 
be initiated solely by the Delaware General Assembly. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 714 n.70.  
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the use of equity to override contract to only the most compelling cir-
cumstances. Despite Carlisle, cases like Haley will be exceptional, not 
the rule in LLC jurisprudence.239 
B.   Publicly Traded LLCs and Limited Partnerships  
 Even if Delaware courts are appropriately reluctant to exercise 
their constitutionally protected equitable powers to override the ex-
press terms of an LLC agreement, publicly traded LLCs, and their 
limited partnership ilk, could prove to be a special exception. The vast 
majority of publicly traded businesses are organized as corporations, 
in which, as noted above, investors are protected by the unwaivable 
fiduciary duties owed by corporate officers and directors.240 But some 
150 publicly traded businesses are unincorporated241—LLCs or, more 
commonly, limited partnerships—almost always organized under  
Delaware law.242  
 Delaware limited partnership law is in many respects identical to 
its LLC law.243 In fact, Delaware’s LLC statute was modeled on the 
state’s limited partnership statute,244 including its express commit-
ment to the “freedom of contract.”245 Exercising this freedom, the 
agreements governing publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships 
commonly contain terms eliminating the fiduciary duty of loyalty, re-
placing that equitable duty with less rigorous contractual 
obligations.246 And in deference to the statutorily mandated freedom of 
                                                                                                                                        
 239. See, e.g., Trusa v. Nepo, No. CV 12071-VCMR, 2017 WL 1379594, at *8 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 13, 2017) (Montgomery-Reeves, V.C.) (asserting that the equitable power recognized in 
Carlisle is an “extreme” measure “that should be granted sparingly”). Note, in many circum-
stances, the Delaware courts may achieve equitable results without even appealing to their 
constitutional equitable powers. The courts might rely instead on established contract law 
doctrines of contra proferentem or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See 
supra note 233.  
 240. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Master Limited Partnership Association, List of Current MLPs & MLP Funds 
(2016), http://www.mlpassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/MLP-LIST.pdf. 
 242. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 598 n.236. 
 243. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290-92 (Del. 1999) (comparing 
the similarities between the Delaware LLC and limited partnership statutes); Bay Ctr. Apart-
ments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *9 n. 43 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (Strine, V.C.) (“[I]n the absence of developed LLC case law, this court 
has often decided LLC cases by looking to analogous provisions in limited partnership law.”).  
 244. See Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 290 (“The Delaware [LLC] Act has been modeled on the 
popular Delaware [Limited Partnership] Act. In fact, its architecture and much of its wording 
is almost identical to that of the Delaware [Limited Partnership] Act. Under the [LLC] Act, a 
member of an LLC is treated much like a limited partner . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 245. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) (2016). 
 246. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 574-96 (reporting empirical 
evidence showing that 88% of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships fully elimi-
nate or exculpate the fiduciary duties of their managers); Strine & Laster, supra note 233, 
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contract, Delaware courts have, in case after case, enforced these 
agreements, dismissing lawsuits brought by public investors alleging 
bad faith or self-dealing on the part of the parties managing or control-
ling the business.247 
 In enforcing contractual fiduciary waivers in the context of a pub-
licly traded LLC or limited partnership, however, the courts have 
sometimes paused to observe the inequity of the situation.248 After all, 
the agreements governing these businesses bear all the hallmarks of 
contracts of adhesion: prolix and confusing, often unread and unnego-
tiated, offered on a take-it-or-leave it basis, and frequently stuffed full 
of terms that favor the drafting party (the firm’s managers and spon-
sors) at the expense of sometimes unsophisticated public investors.249 
Thus, in Encore Energy, for instance, after finding the “near absence 
under the [LP agreement] of any duties whatsoever [owed] to [the] 
public equity holders,” Vice Chancellor Parsons observed in dictum 
that “[i]nvestors apprehensive about the risks inherent in waiving the 
fiduciary duties of those with whom they entrust their investments 
may be well advised to avoid [publicly traded] limited partnerships.”250 
And on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court likewise cautioned public 
investors “seek[ing] the protections the common law duties of loyalty 
                                                                                                                                        
at 12 (observing, from a judicial perspective, that “[a]mong the hallmarks of these agree-
ments [governing publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships] are broad waivers of all 
fiduciary duties”). 
 247. See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008); Dieckman v. Regency GP 
LP, No. 11130-CB, 2016 WL 1223348 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2016); In re Kinder Morgan, Inc. 
Corp. Reorg. Litig., No. 10093-VCL, 2015 WL 4975270 (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015), aff’d, No. 
515, 2015, 2016 WL 912184 (Del. Mar. 10, 2016); Gerber v. EPE Holdings, LLC, No. 3543-
VCN, 2013 WL 209658 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2013); In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder 
Litig., No. 6347-VCP, 2012 WL 3792997 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012), aff’d, 72 A.3d 93 (Del. 
2013); In re K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P. Unitholders Litig., No. 6301-VCP, 2012 WL 
1142351 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2012), aff’d, 67 A.3d 354, 360-61 (Del. 2013); Brinckerhoff v. 
Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., No. 5526-VCN, 2011 WL 4599654 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011), aff’d, 
67 A.3d 369 (Del. 2013). 
 248. See, e.g., Dieckman, 2016 WL 1223348, at *11 (Bouchard, C.) (“I recognize it may 
seem harsh to shield a conflicted transaction from judicial review . . . without requiring the 
disclosure of all material information.”); Gerber v. EPE Holdings, LLC, No. 3543-VCN, 2013 
WL 209658, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2013) (Noble, V.C.) (“It is not difficult to understand 
[the plaintiff-investor’s] skepticism and frustration, but his real problem is the contract that 
binds him and his fellow limited partners.”); Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, No. 
5989-VCN, 2012 WL 34442, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012) (Noble, V.C.) (“The facts of this 
case take the reader and the writer to the outer reaches of conduct allowable under [Dela-
ware law]. It is easy to be troubled by the allegations.”). 
 249. See Strine & Laster, supra note 233, at 11-13; see also Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, 
supra note 53, at 482-84 (questioning the assumptions underlying the contractual conception 
of LLCs and limited partnerships for publicly traded firms). 
 250. In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder Litig., No. 6347–VCP, 2012 WL 
3792997, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012) (Parsons, V.C.). 
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and care provide . . . to invest in a Delaware corporation” rather than 
an LLC or limited partnership.251 
 Sounding their own skepticism about the freedom of contract as ap-
plied to publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships, Chief Justice 
Strine joined by Vice Chancellor Laster, in a recently co-authored book 
chapter,252 have bemoaned the ability of these businesses to contractu-
ally eliminate all fiduciary obligations that would otherwise be owed 
to public investors.253 To address this problem, the two jurists have 
proposed amending Delaware’s alternative entity statutes to make the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty mandatory—contractually unwaivable—for 
publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships.254  
 But the upshot of Carlisle is that the Delaware Chancery Court al-
ready possesses the constitutional power to enforce the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty notwithstanding the express terms of an agreement purport-
ing to waive that duty.255 While an amendment to Delaware’s statutes 
would lend the courts the legislature’s imprimatur, under the reason-
ing of Carlisle, such an amendment is unnecessary as a strictly 
constitutional matter.  
 To be sure, the chancery court’s assertion of its constitutional power 
to override the statutorily mandated freedom of contract risks a con-
frontation between the state judiciary and the Delaware General 
Assembly. As noted above, the state’s pragmatically minded legisla-
tors will be sensitive to any judicial decision that potentially imperils 
the state’s thriving LLC and limited partnership tax base.256 But, in 
the narrow context of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships, 
the legislature might be less concerned by the courts’ assertion of eq-
uity to override the express terms of an agreement. Because the vast 
majority of Delaware LLCs and limited partnerships are privately 
held, the approximately 150 publicly traded unincorporated busi-
nesses represent only a very small slice of Delaware’s alternative 
entity tax base.257 Together, these publicly traded unincorporated busi-
nesses contribute approximately $45,000 (or less than 0.0002%) of 
                                                                                                                                        
 251. Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, LP, 72 A.3d 93, 109 (Del. 2013). 
 252. See generally Strine & Laster, supra note 233.  
 253. See id. at 11-13. 
 254. See Strine & Laster, supra note 233, at 13 (proposing that “[f]or publicly traded 
entities, the duty of loyalty would be non-waivable”). 
 255. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 571-72. For scale, consider 
that, in 2014 alone, 121,592 LLCs and 9,721 limited partnerships were formed in Delaware. 
See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2015),  
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2014%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8EZ-WHBV]. 
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Delaware’s nearly $244.4 million received in annual taxes from its do-
mestic LLCs and limited partnerships.258 As a result, judicial rulings 
that are perceived to adversely affect only Delaware’s publicly traded 
LLCs and limited partnerships are less likely to raise the ire of the 
state’s General Assembly. 
 Note, however, that even in the narrow context of publicly traded 
LLCs and limited partnerships, there are reasons the chancery court 
ought to be reluctant in asserting its equitable power over the ex-
press terms of the firm’s governing agreement. For one, equitable 
power should be deployed only where a litigant lacks an adequate 
remedy at law.259 The public investors of an LLC or limited partner-
ship might well have adequate options for legal redress, even in the 
face of a governing agreement unilaterally drafted to be protective 
of those managing or otherwise in control of the business.260 An ade-
quate remedy at law—namely money damages—might arise from a 
claim for breach of the express terms of that agreement.261 Even 
where there is no breach of the express contract terms, an adequate 
legal remedy might arise from a claim for breach of the implied con-
tractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing,262 which is implied 
                                                                                                                                        
 258. Domestic LLCs and limited partnerships—whether publicly traded or privately 
held, and regardless of profits, revenue or size—pay Delaware an annual flat tax of $300 for 
the simple privilege of being organized under Delaware law. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.  
6, § 18-1107(b) (2016) (LLCs); id. § 17-1109(a) (limited partnerships). In 2015, Delaware re-
ceived in total $244.4 million in annual taxes from its domestic LLCs and limited 
partnerships. See DEL. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FINANCIAL SUMMARY: GOVERNOR’S 
RECOMMENDED BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 8 (2016), http://budget.delaware.gov/ 
budget/fy2017/documents/operating/vol1/financial-summary.pdf. For an analysis of Dela-
ware’s flat tax structure for LLCs and limited partnerships, see generally Manesh, Market 
for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 204-10. 
 259. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (explaining this principle of  
equity jurisprudence). 
 260. See, e.g., In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *8 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (ruling that a contractual provision waiving all conflicts of interest 
between the LLC and its controlling unitholder does not waive the duty of loyalty as it ap-
plies to a conflict of interests between the controlling unitholder and the LLC’s minority 
unitholders); Kahn v. Portnoy, No. 3515-CC, 2008 WL 5197164, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008) 
(ruling that a contractual provision waiving all conflicts of interests between the LLC’s man-
agers and its unitholders does not waive the duty of loyalty as it applies to a conflict of 
interests between the LLC’s managers and the LLC itself). 
 261. See, e.g., In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, No. 7141-VCL, 2015 WL 1815846, at *27 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2015) (awarding judgment for damages against general partner for breach 
of express contractual duty). 
 262. See, e.g., Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 425 (Del. 2013) 
(holding that plaintiff-investor stated a valid claim based on the implied contractual cove-
nant against the managers of a publicly traded limited partnership).  
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into every contract263 and unwaivable under both LLC and limited 
partnership statutes.264  
 Importantly, however, a party does not have an adequate legal rem-
edy simply because that party could have better protected itself ex ante 
in the terms of the LLC or limited partnership agreement.265 To be 
sure, a party’s voluntary assent to an agreement that leaves that party 
vulnerable to later actions that were reasonably foreseeable and could 
have easily be contractually proscribed ex ante weighs against the 
court’s use of equitable discretion to protect that party ex post facto. 
Equity protects the vigilant, after all.266 But the fact that a party failed 
to protect herself ex ante alone cannot mean that the party has an ade-
quate remedy at law; otherwise, equity would have virtually no role to 
play in the world of business associations, where the relationships be-
tween the entity, its investors, and managers are created by consent, 
and the parties arguably always possess the ability to protect them-
selves ex ante.267 
 A second reason that courts should be chary to equitably intervene 
in the context of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships is that 
various market-based considerations associated with these entities 
weigh against the judicial use of equitable discretion to protect inves-
tors. For example, even if the agreements governing publicly traded 
LLCs and limited partnerships are prolix and confusing, public inves-
tors benefit under federal securities law from extensive and explicit 
disclosures of the business and legal risks involved.268 And the securi-
ties purchased by these investors have been priced by a liquid market 
that is at least to some degree efficient, meaning that the terms of the 
                                                                                                                                        
 263. See supra note 187; see also supra note 233 (comparing judicial application of the 
implied contractual covenant versus equity). 
 264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2016) (governing limited partnerships);  
id. § 18-1101(c) (governing LLCs).  
 265. But see CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2011) (asserting that because 
the plaintiff “could have negotiated a contractual remedy at law” but did not, the plaintiff 
“has ample remedy at law”). 
 266. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 418, at 169. Although this maxim of equity is ordinarily 
used to mean that equity will not aid those who have slept on their rights in pursuing a valid 
claim, it can be generalized to support the proposition that equity will not reward those who 
were slothful or negligent in protecting themselves. 
 267. Consider, for example, Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 98 (Del. Ch. 2004), where then-
Vice Chancellor Strine granted judicial dissolution because the “detailed exit” mechanism 
contemplated by the relevant LLC agreement “fails as an adequate remedy for Haley because 
it does not equitably effect the separation of the parties.”  
 268. See, e.g., STEPHON J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS, 89-99, 191-93 (Thompson & Foundation Press eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing the man-
datory disclosures required for public offerings of securities as well as from companies with 
publicly traded securities); cf. Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, No. 11130-CB, 2016 WL 1223348, 
at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2016) (observing that plaintiffs may have legal recourse under federal 
securities law); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1025 (Del. Ch. 2010) (same).  
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governing agreement—whether management- or investor-friendly—
have already been priced into the securities that the investors 
bought.269 As a result, even if the investors in publicly traded LLC and 
limited partnership do not read or understand the unilaterally drafted 
terms that they are agreeing to by investing, and even if those terms 
are unduly favorable to the business’s managers and controllers, the 
market ensures that the public investors are getting exactly what they 
pay for. Indeed, given the sensitivity to markets and pricing, some ev-
idence suggests that publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships do 
not simply eliminate fiduciary duties, but replace fiduciary duties with 
contract- and market-based alternatives that aim to appropriately in-
centivize managers and protect outside investors.270  
 In light of these considerations, equitable intervention on behalf 
of investors in publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships risks 
unfairly giving those investors more than the benefit of their bar-
gain.271 Thus, even in the narrow context of publicly traded 
unincorporated firms, the circumstances for the court to assert equity 
over the express terms of the governing agreement must be excep-
tional. The challenged conduct must be something that, although 
perhaps contemplated in general terms, is not specifically and explic-
itly permitted by the agreement governing the firm;272 and, moreover, 
the conduct must be so peculiar, outrageous, or otherwise unforesee-
able that it is doubtful the market could have priced the risk of such 
conduct into the value of the securities.  
                                                                                                                                        
 269. See, e.g., CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 268, at 28-29 (describing the efficient cap-
ital market hypothesis); cf. Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, No. 5989-VCN, LLC, 2012 
WL 34442, at *10 n.42 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012) (Noble, V.C.) (observing that “[i]f the protection 
provided by Delaware law is scant, then the. . . units of these [publicly traded] partnerships 
might trade at a discount”).  
 270. See Suren Gomtsian, The Governance of Publicly Traded Limited Liability Companies, 
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 207, 225-69 (2015) (providing evidence of various contractual and non-con-
tractual mechanisms protective of minority holders in publicly traded LLCs); cf. supra note 229. 
 271. To be sure, it may be the case that since the time of Carlisle the possibility of equi-
table intervention has been priced into the publicly traded securities of LLCs and LPs and, 
therefore, the price paid by subsequent purchasers of such securities has already factored in 
this potential. But cases like Carlisle may be rare enough (and, indeed, there has not yet 
been an analogous example in the context of publicly traded LLCs and LPs) that the market 
may not have yet priced it. Even if Delaware courts decide more cases along of the lines of 
Carlisle, asserting the courts’ equitable power notwithstanding the express terms of a firm’s 
governing agreement, and even if those cases involve a publicly traded LLC and LP, the facts 
and the terms at issue in any given case may be idiosyncratic enough that the market will 
not price such decisions into shares of other publicly traded LLCs and LPs. Manesh, Market 
for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 235-38 (discussing how the contractibility permitted under 
LLC law limits the network effects of judicial precedents). 
 272. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The lasting impact of Carlisle ultimately rests on how the Dela-
ware courts approach its conflict with Bax and the constitutional role 
of equity in LLCs. As this Article has argued, Bax’s flawed under-
standing of equity,273 coupled with recent developments involving 
Delaware’s LLC statute and judiciary,274 suggest that Bax’s future 
precedential value is not promising. 
 If Carlisle is indeed vindicated, then it portends a resurgent role 
for equity—and a fundamental crack in the seemingly solid contract-
law foundations of LLCs. In practice, the consequences will be sub-
tle, but far-reaching. Because under Delaware’s unusual 
constitutional framework, equity cannot be subordinated by statute 
or contract. Only a state constitutional amendment can subordinate 
the judicial power to “to do right and justice.”275 
  
                                                                                                                                        
 273. See supra Section IV.A. 
 274. See supra Section IV.B. 
 275. In theory at least, an alternative route to subordinating equity to contract would be 
to overrule the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state constitution in Dupont. 
See supra note 72-76 and accompanying text. Given that this interpretation has been repeat-
edly reaffirmed, most recently in both Bax and Carlisle, however, a reversal of Dupont seems 
improbable. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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